City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence2/20/2002
will affirm a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and if its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, 8, 632 N.W.2d 1. While we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, questions of law are fully reviewable. State v. Wanzek, 1999 ND 163, 5, 598 N.W.2d 811.
A.
[ ] To stop a moving vehicle for investigative purposes, an officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a law has been or is being violated. State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, 27, 615 N.W.2d 515. Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity. State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 8, 559 N.W.2d 538. Although the concept of reasonable suspicion is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules, we have held reasonable suspicion does require more than a "mere hunch." State v. Loh, 2000 ND 188, 5, 618 N.W.2d 477. In determining whether an investigative stop is valid, we use an objective standard and look to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 9-13; City of Minot v. Johnson, 1999 ND 241, 5, 603 N.W.2d 485. In City of Fargo v. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, 9, 575 N.W.2d 901 (citations omitted), we explained:
We do not require an officer to isolate single factors which signal a potential violation of the law; but instead, "officers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make the determination whether all of the circumstances viewed together create a reasonable suspicion of potential criminal activity." When assessing reasonableness, we consider inferences and deductions an investigating officer would make which may elude a layperson.
[ ] When, as here, one officer relays a directive or request for action to another officer without relaying the underlying facts and circumstances, the directing officer's knowledge is imputed to the acting officer. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 11, 559 N.W.2d 538. The ultimate conclusion of whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is fully reviewable on appeal. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, 20, 615 N.W.2d 515.
B.
[ ] This case is somewhat similar to Ovind, 1998 ND 69, 575 N.W.2d 901. In Ovind, police officers responded at 1:45 a.m. to a dispatch reporting a fight at a Taco Bell restaurant. The first officer arrived at the scene between forty-five seconds to one minute after the dispatch and observed two vehicles in the parking lot. One vehicle was backing out of a parking spot, and the other vehicle was exiting the parking lot. The officer called for other officers to stop the car exiting the lot, and he activated his overhead lights and pulled his vehicle behind the car backing out of the parking spot. As the officer approached the vehicle, passengers yelled to him to stop the other car because "they beat us up." Id. at 4. The officer smelled alcohol on the driver and eventually arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The issue on appeal was whether the police officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's car.
[ ] We noted corroboration of a tip through observation of illegality may not be practical in cases involving the propriety of a limited investigative stop near the scene of a recent crime:
In dealing with this issue, some courts, including the Minnesota Supreme Court, have recognized certain situations require facilitating police crime scene
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