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City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence2/20/2002
investigation. See State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. 1990); Appelgate [v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987)]; see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(g) (3d ed. 1996). Where police officers are presented with such a situation, the court in Appelgate explains, "`experience has shown that when a victim or witness cannot name the offender his apprehension is unlikely unless he is rather promptly found in the immediate area.'" 402 N.W.2d at 108 (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(d), at 460 (2d ed. 1987)). It is therefore necessary for police officers investigating a reported crime scene to have some limited authority to "freeze" the situation. Id. Even in circumstances where no one person can be singled out as the probable offender, "`police [officers] must sometimes be allowed to take some action intermediate to that of arrest and nonseizure activity.'" Id. Thus, an investigative stop of a person present at the scene of a recently committed crime may be permissible without violating the Fourth Amendment. Such a stop is especially deemed permissible where only a limited number of persons are present at the scene of a violent crime. Wold v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. 1988). We agree with this reasoning.
Professor LaFave, in his discussion of allowing police to "freeze" a situation, certainly does not condone a "dragnet approach," which results "in the temporary seizure of a large number of persons within the range of [a suspect's] possible flight." 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.4(g), at 195. But rather in this context, "selective investigative procedures" are necessary "whereby seizures are made only of those as to whom there exists a `reasonable possibility'" of being involved in the criminal activity. Id. LaFave provides the following six factors which, among others, may be considered in determining what facts and circumstances establish this "reasonable possibility" and would justify stopping a motor vehicle or possible offender:
(1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled; (2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; (3) the number of persons about in that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the offender's flight; (5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and (6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation. Id. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, 12-13, 575 N.W.2d 901 (footnote omitted).
We held "as a matter of law the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Ovind as having been involved in the reported fight; therefore, the officer was justified in the limited investigative stop of Ovind." Id. at 17.
[ ] The district court in this case found Ovind distinguishable because the police in Ovind "had an articulated suspicion that a crime had been committed," and in this case, " rguing is not a crime." Although the evidence suggests Officer Rose "really didn't have full understanding of what was going on" when he radioed Officer Toso to stop Lawrence's vehicle upon Houle's direction, we conclude the district court's finding the officers knew there was no physical altercation, but only a "verbal altercation," is supported by sufficient competent evidence, and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Nevertheless, the district court's conclusion that arguing cannot violate criminal law is incorrect.
[ ] Disorderly conduct is proscribed by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01(1), which provides, in part:
. An individual
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