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Winegar v. Greenfield Polce Department3/27/2002
Law of Workers' Compensation (1991) 7-612 to 7-941, Section 41.64; 1 Ohio Jury Instructions (1988) 183, Section 11.10 ("There may be more than one proximate cause."). Ohio case law also supports this fundamental tenet of tort law: "In Ohio, when two factors combine to produce damage or illness, each is a proximate cause." Norris v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 66, 67, 548 N.E.2d 304, 305. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 587-588, 575 N.E.2d 828, 830.
Officer Schraw's actions or failure to act and James Fillmore's actions could both be proximate causes of the decedent's death, and the issue of whether the officer's actions were a proximate cause of that death has yet to be litigated. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this context, and we need not further address it.
Appellee also argues that the criminal actions of driving while intoxicated and aggravated vehicular homicide are superseding, intervening causes of decedent's death.
Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence and injury, thus relieving one of liability for his negligence, depends upon whether that intervening cause was a conscious and responsible agency which could or should have eliminated the hazard, and whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the one who was guilty of the negligence. (Paragraph two of the syllabus of Thrash v. U- Drive-It Co. , 158 Ohio St. 465 [110 N.E.2d 419], approved and followed.) Cascone v. Herb Kay Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 155, 451 N.E.2d 815, paragraph one of the syllabus.
The Supreme Court of Ohio further held that
Where the facts are such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the intervening cause was a conscious and responsible agency which could or should have eliminated the hazard, whether the intervening act or cause constituted a concurrent or superseding cause, and whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the original party guilty of negligence, present questions for submission to a jury which generally may not be resolved by summary judgment. (Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co. , 153 Ohio St. 31 [90 N.E.2d 859], approved and followed.) Cascone, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
The Mudrich court, whose decision was approved and followed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cascone, further stated that
Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence and injury depends upon whether that intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the one who was guilty of the negligence. If an injury is the natural and probable consequence of a negligent act and it is such as should have been foreseen in the light of all the attending circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result of the negligence. It is not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular injury. It is sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone. Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the facts surrounding the officer's stop of Fillmore and Simmons are not clear and unambiguous. Therefore, more than one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from those facts in regard to whether the officer's actions were a proximate cause of the decedent's death, whether the damages which resulted were foreseeable to the officer, and whether the actions of Fillmore and Simmons after the stop were also foreseeable to the officer. See Schutt v. Rudolph-Libbe, Inc. (Mar. 31, 1995), Wood App. No. WD-94-063, unreported. This issue should be presented to the jury for resolution.
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