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State v. Benoit2/20/2002
owing, voluntary waiver of his rights. He further asserts that the evidence obtained from the violation of his Miranda rights was the sole basis for the officer's later DUI stop and that accordingly, all evidence from that stop must be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree."
Defendant's appeal centers on his contention that he was in custody at the time of the initial breath test and citation, and therefore, should have been administered a Miranda warning. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the United States Supreme Court declared that the series of procedural safeguards, now known as Miranda warnings, are necessary to assure that a suspect's constitutional right to remain silent is "scrupulously honored" by law enforcement officers. State v. Trombley, 147 Vt. 371, 374, 518 A.2d 20, 23 (1986).
Defendant's claim of error is grounded entirely on the premise that Miranda warnings should have been given to defendant when police officers administered breath tests to minors at the Colchester party. As such, it is inherently flawed. Even if we were to extend the application of Miranda to circumstances where an individual is subject to only civil citation - an extension for which defendant cites no authority - police are not required to refrain from gathering "non-testimonial" evidence from an individual in custody. We have previously held that an evidentiary breath test is "non-testimonial" in nature and thus may be administered even after a defendant has invoked Miranda rights. State v. Blouin, 168 Vt. 119, 124, 716 A.2d 826, 829 (1998).
Given that police were not required to read defendant Miranda warnings before administering a breath test, the knowledge that defendant had been cited as a minor in the possession of alcohol as a consequence of the breath test results is not "fruit of the poisonous tree." That information, combined with the officer's observation of the defendant driving into the driveway and slumping down in an apparent attempt to hide, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that a motor vehicle violation had been committed. See State v. Paquette, 151 Vt. 631, 634, 563 A.2d 632, 635 (1989) (valid stop must be based on reasonable articulable facts and rational inferences to warrant intrusion). Acting on that suspicion, the officer then went to the door of the residence to question the driver. An officer may knock on the door of a residence and speak to the driver of a vehicle he saw approach the residence where he has otherwise valid, reasonable suspicion, for the investigation. State v. Elkins, 155 Vt. 9, 14, 580 A.2d 1200, 1202-03 (1990). Defendant's denial that he was driving the car, after the officer had just observed him doing so, bloodshot, watery eyes, odor of intoxicants, and refusal to do dexterity tests provided ample probable cause to believe that defendant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Affirmed.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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