Tomlin v. State5/31/2002
0), we stated:
"'"As the Supreme Court explained in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961):
"'"'To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court....'
"'"The standard of fairness does not require jurors to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035-2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). Thus, ' he proper manner for ascertaining whether adverse publicity may have biased the prospective jurors is through the voir dire examination.' Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296, 1299 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978)." "'Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 80 (Ala. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 157 (1986).'" Dorsey, ___ So. 2d at ___.
It is abundantly clear after reading the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors that the trial court committed no error in denying Tomlin's motion for a change of venue.
IV.
Tomlin argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow individual sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors, in violation of his right to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
Here, the trial court did not allow individual sequestered voir dire of all of the 75 prospective jurors. The trial court allowed voir dire in panels of 15. It appears from the record that the last two panels were questioned as a group. Moreover, the jurors had already filled out extensive juror questionnaires. The trial court allowed individual voir dire of those prospective jurors, who indicated that they had prior knowledge about the case. At times, other questions were also asked of these jurors.
This Court has repeatedly upheld the denial of individual voir dire in capital cases. See Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001); Dorsey v. State, [Ms. CR-97-1522, May 25, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2001); Ferguson v. State, [Ms. CR-97-2524, June 30, 2000] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), aff'd, [Ms. 1992209, July 6, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2001); Broadnax v. State, [Ms. CR-97-0113, June 30, 2000] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), aff'd, [Ms. 1000763, November 2, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2001); Smith v. State, 795 So. 2d 788 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 795 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 2001); Woods v. State, 789 So. 2d 896 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), aff'd, 789 So. 2d 941 (Ala. 2001); Whitehead v. State, 777 So. 2d 781 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), aff'd, 777 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001); Hammonds v. State, 777 So. 2d 750 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), aff'd, 777 SO. 2d 777 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001); Merrill v. State, 741 So. 2d 1099 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998).
There is no indication that the method used by the trial court to question prospective jurors prejudiced Tomlin. Tomlin argues in his brief that he was prejudiced by the method, but he cites no specific instance indicating how. Indeed the voir dire of the jurors does not support any showing of prejudice as to the method used in questioning the prospective jurors.
Tomlin also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jurors to be questioned about their views regarding the death penalty. He contends that because the jury was to have no role in sentencing, the jurors should not have been asked any questions about the death penalt
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