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People v. Chavez6/19/2002
ion that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.) Thus, " xclusion of impeaching evidence on collateral matters which has only slight probative value on the issue of veracity does not infringe on the defendant's [guarantee to] confrontation. (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372 . . . .)" (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 350.) An infringement of that confrontation guarantee occurs only where the jury would have perceived a materially different impression of the witness's credibility if the defendant had been allowed to pursue the proposed line of cross-examination. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.)
The record clearly refutes appellant's claims that his right to cross-examine Ahumada had been violated. Only relevant evidence is admissible. (See, e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350; People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1092.) A defendant therefore is not entitled to elicit evidence which lacked probative value to the issues presented. Appellant's defense theory was that Ahumada invented appellant's purported statement. His proposed line of inquiry concerning whether Ahumada told the prosecutor about the statement on the Friday before trial only tangentially touched on that issue, and thus, pertained to a collateral matter. Rather, in order to impeach Ahumada's credibility, as appellant's attorney herself essentially acknowledged, she should have inquired of Brown whether Ahumada told him about appellant's statement at the time he allegedly uttered it, and if so, why had Brown omitted the statement from his report. Appellant had the opportunity to recall Brown to make such inquires but elected not to do so.
4. No Prosecutorial Misconduct Shown
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the law regarding voluntary intoxication. We find no misconduct.
"`The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. "`A prosecutor's . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct "so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process."'" (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214 . . . , People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 . . . .) Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves "`"the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury. "'" (People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820.)' (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 . . . .)" People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: "Given [that appellant] during this period was under the influence of alcohol, some of you may go in back and say to yourselves, well, if he was under the influence of alcohol, how do we hold him responsible for the other acts, which is a legitimate question. You have got an instruction on that called a voluntary intoxication instruction, which basically tells you that if [appellant] or if a person voluntarily becomes intoxicated, he is no less liable criminally for any acts he commits." (Italics added.)
Appellant's attorney objected on the ground the prosecutor misstated the law. In response to the court's request that he "restate" his argument, the prosecutor stated. "I will actually read the instruction to you, so I make sure. Voluntary intoxication. No act committed by a person is a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal because of that condition. You will have that inst
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