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People v. Rizo4/24/2002
ate of mind and was not hearsay. " statement which does not directly declare a mental state, but is merely circumstantial evidence of that state of mind, is not hearsay. It is not received for the truth of the matter stated, but rather whether the statement is true or not, the fact such statement was made is relevant to a determination of the declarant's state of mind." (People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 389.)
Ivan's statement also could have been admitted as a direct statement of his mental state, if the statement "I am going to kill you tonight" were construed to mean "I intend to kill you." If so interpreted, the statement would be hearsay but would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 (section 1250). That section makes admissible hearsay evidence of "a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design," when the declarant's state of mind is an issue in the action. (§ 1250, subd. (a)(1).)
The court plainly understood the relevance of the evidence to show state of mind. Although it did rely in part on the coconspirator exception in admitting the evidence, it also ruled that Ivan's statement was admissible to show his state of mind pursuant to section 1250.
The court was correct. Evidence of a defendant's threat to kill the victim, or even to kill members of a class of persons to which the victim belongs, is relevant in a murder case to show intent. (People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778 [threat against victim]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 757 [threat to kill any police officer who attempted to arrest defendant]; People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 [defendant's statement he would not hesitate to eliminate witnesses if he committed a crime].) Such evidence is admissible under section 1250 "unless the circumstances in which the statements were made, the lapse of time, or other evidence suggests that the state of mind was transitory and no longer existed at the time of the charged offense." (Karis, supra, at p. 637.) There was no evidence in this case to suggest Ivan's state of mind was transitory.
The blue jury defendants argue Ivan's state of mind was not relevant to their guilt. That argument overlooks the fact the prosecution had to prove someone murdered Galvan before it could convict any other defendant as an aider and abettor to the murder. Therefore, evidence that Ivan threatened to kill Galvan was relevant to the guilt of all defendants. The court avoided the possibility the jury might consider Ivan's statement as evidence of another defendant's state of mind by instructing the jury before Miguel Santoyo testified to Ivan's statement that the evidence could not be considered as it related to the other defendants' states of mind.
Defendants also argue the court should not have allowed Riverside Police Officer Michael Cobb to testify, over a defense hearsay objection, that Santoyo had told him Ivan had said he was going to kill Galvan. Officer Cobb's recounting of Santoyo's statement added another layer of hearsay for which a separate exception was necessary. The Attorney General argues Santoyo's statement to Officer Cobb was admissible as a prior consistent statement under Evidence Code sections 791 and 1236 to rebut the defense's charges that Santoyo's trial testimony was fabricated.
Defendants point out that Evidence Code sections 791 and 1236 only allow admission of a prior consistent statement if the statement was made before the witness's motive for fabrication is alleged to have arisen. (§§ 791, subd. (b), 1236.) They contend Santoyo had a motive to fabricate long before he made the statement to Officer Cobb, because of lo
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