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People v. Rizo4/24/2002
failure to specify the potential target crimes "may have led jurors to rely on different crimes, without unanimity . . . ." The court held this argument was "dashed by Prettyman, which expressly declares no need for unanimity." (Id., at p. 732.)
Defendants also argue that, even if Prettyman's statement is correct as a matter of California law, federal constitutional law requires that the jury unanimously agree on the predicate acts which a defendant committed in order to impose liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. They cite Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624 [111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555]) (Schad) and Richardson v. U.S. (1999) 526 U.S. 813 [119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985] (Richardson).
Schad does not support defendants' argument. As the California Supreme Court has noted, Schad "explained that the jury need not agree on the means by which a crime has been committed, stating that it is appropriate that `"different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict."'" (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1025, citing Schad, supra, 501 U.S. 624, 631-632.)
Richardson also does not assist defendants. Richardson involved a prosecution under a federal statute which made it a crime to engage in a "`continuing criminal enterprise'" by committing a "`continuing series of violations'" of the drug laws. The court held the jury had to agree unanimously as to each individual violation the defendant had committed. (Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 815.) However, it reached that conclusion because it determined each violation was a separate element of the offense, not just a means of satisfying a single element consisting of a "`continuing series of violations.'" (Id., at pp. 815, 818.) As in Schad, the court in Richardson specifically recognized that as a general rule "a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element" of a crime. (Richardson, supra, at p. 817.)
This case is not comparable to Richardson. The requirement that an aider and abettor assist in the commission of a target crime is a single crime element which can be satisfied through various means, by proving a variety of possible target crimes. The various target crimes are not themselves elements of the offense of aiding and abetting, but are alternative means of proving the element of assisting a target crime. As noted, "the jury need not agree on the means by which a crime has been committed . . . ." (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1025.)
In fact, it is not even necessary that a jury in a murder case decide unanimously whether the defendant was guilty as an aider and abettor or as a direct perpetrator. All that is required is that as each juror be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder on one theory or the other. (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918.) The California Supreme Court has held that this rule "passes federal constitutional muster." (Id., at p. 919 [citing Schad, supra, 501 U.S. 624].)
A fortiori, jurors need not agree on what acts the defendant committed. As the Supreme Court explained in Santamaria, "Sometimes, as probably occurred here, the jury simply cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who did what." Yet, the lack of agreement is no impediment to conviction. (People v. Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th 903, 919.) Thus, Victor's complaint that the jury might have disagreed "about just what Victor Rizo and his brothers did o
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