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People v. Rizo4/24/2002
r did not, do" is misplaced.
Richardson also noted the fact that the category of drug violations which could form the required series of violations was so broad as to encompass behavior of "varying degrees of seriousness," ranging from removing drug labels to endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance. The court was troubled by the fact that jurors might disagree so widely as to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and still convict him or her of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. (Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 819.) No such danger exists here, however. Each juror had to find, at least, that defendants assisted in a crime of which a natural and probable consequence was the murder of Galvan. Crimes of which a natural and probable consequence is murder all, by definition, involve serious criminal conduct.
Victor additionally argues that there was no evidence to show that, in fact, he committed any of the target offenses. He misapprehends the requirements for aiding and abetting. The aider and abettor need not commit the target crime, only aid, promote, encourage, or instigate its commission. (Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 267, 271.) There was ample evidence Victor, and the other blue jury defendants, were aiders and abettors under that standard.
F. Instruction that Voluntary Manslaughter Requires Intent to Kill
In accordance with then-current law, the court instructed the jury that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill. After this case was tried, the Supreme Court held that intent to kill is not required for voluntary manslaughter, as long as the defendant acts with conscious disregard for human life. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-91 (Blakeley); People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 109-111 (Lasko).)
Defendants contend the instruction that voluntary manslaughter requires intent to kill was prejudicial. They assert that, since second degree murder on an implied malice theory does not require intent to kill, if the jury thought the killing of Galvan was not intentional, it would have been led to convict defendants of murder rather than acquit them, having no option to convict of voluntary manslaughter on the instructions given and having not been instructed on involuntary manslaughter.
The test for prejudicial error in giving an erroneous instruction that voluntary manslaughter requires intent to kill is whether it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome (i.e., conviction of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder) absent the error. (People v. Crowe (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 86, 96; Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 111.) Such an outcome was not reasonably probable here.
Manslaughter is "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." (Pen. Code, § 192.) A defendant lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in "`limited, explicitly defined circumstances'": when the defendant kills either in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, or in unreasonable self-defense - the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. (Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 87-88.) Accordingly, the killing of Galvan was murder if it was done either with the intent to kill (express malice) or with conscious disregard for life (implied malice), and was not done in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in unreasonable self-defense (also called "imperfect" self-defense), so as to negate malice. (Id., at pp. 87-91; Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 104, 109-111.)
The evidence virtually compelled a finding of express or implied malice. Ivan threatened to kill Galvan in the nightclub, and threats to ki
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