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People v. Scott6/21/2002
urt recently undertook an extensive comparison of California's habitual offender statutes with other states' habitual offender statutes. (Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1513-1516.) We discovered that the spirit of California's Three Strikes law is not uncommon, that most states make some provision for increasing a habitual offender's punishment. (Id. at p. 1513.) While defendant's sentence would be treated differently in some other states, California's punishment is not the harshest. For example, both Louisiana and Mississippi impose life sentences without parole. (Id. at p. 1516.) Specifically, Mississippi requires life imprisonment for a third felony if any of the prior felonies were violent. (Id. at p. 1514.) Rhode Island's scheme also is similar to California's Three Strike law; although discretionary, Rhode Island provides for a 25 year to life sentence for a third felony conviction. (Id. at p. 1515.) In Martinez, we acknowledged "that California is among the few states that impose a life sentence for a third felony conviction that is neither violent nor serious where at least one prior crime involved violence." (71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516.) Nevertheless we concluded, " hat California's punishment scheme is among the most extreme does not compel the conclusion that it is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. This state constitutional consideration does not require California to march in lockstep with other states in fashioning a penal code . . . . [ ] he needs and concerns of a particular state may induce it to treat certain crimes or particular repeat offenders more severely than any other state . . . . [ ] Whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the offense is a question of degree. The choice of fitting and proper penalty is not an exact science but a legislative skill involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the weighing of practical alternatives, consideration of relevant policy factors, and responsiveness to the public will. In some cases, leeway for experimentation may be permissible. Thus, the judiciary should not interfere in the process unless a statute prescribes a penalty "`out of all proportion to the offense.'" (People v. Cooper, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 827, quoting In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 423-424.)" (Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516.) While California's laws are severe, we are convinced they do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
Of course, analyzing whether a prison sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual must be tailored to the individual defendant. Our prior opinion in Martinez and conclusion about Mr. Martinez does not dictate our conclusion regarding the defendant in the present case. Here, while defendant is neither the most violent criminal nor the most frequent recidivist, his current record of several felony convictions, including residential burglary, multiple robberies, and auto theft, supports the need for lengthy incarceration. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, under either the California or the federal constitution, the trial court's decision to impose the term of 40 years to life was not "`so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' [Citation.]" (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.)
Taking into account the totality of the circumstances and not only the nature of the current crime, we conclude the punishment imposed is not constitutionally infirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Premo, Acting P.J.
Elia, J.
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