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State v. Meyer6/19/2002
view is for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. A verdict will be upheld where there is substantial evidence in the record supporting each element of the charge. State v. Tinius, 527 N.W.2d 414, 415 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Substantial evidence means evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
We view the record in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Bass, 349 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Iowa 1984). We draw legitimate inferences and presumptions that fairly and reasonably arise from the evidence in the record. Id. Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative in the examination process. State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981). All evidence, however, must be considered, not just evidence supporting the verdict. Bass, 349 N.W.2d at 500. In the end, the evidence must do more than raise suspicion, speculation or conjecture. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d at 479.
B. Merits.
For the reasons already stated in division II of this opinion, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the State proved the required causal nexus between Meyer's criminal conduct and Carr's death.
We next turn to Meyer's contentions involving the medical decisions made in this case. In deciding whether medical treatments are superseding causes, our supreme court has stated as follows: "The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about." Garcia, 616 N.W.2d at 597 (quotations omitted). Normal is not what is usual, customary, foreseeable, or to be expected. Murray, 512 N.W.2d at 551 (citation omitted). Instead, it means that the court in looking at the matter after the event does not regard the intervention of the new force as so extraordinary as to fall outside the class of normal events. Id. (Citation omitted.) Using this standard, we conclude that the decisions to perform surgery on Carr and to remove Carr from life support were normal consequences of the situation created by Meyer's criminal conduct.
Next, we consider Meyer's argument that he never intended to harm Carr and he never intended any specific criminal act. He asserts that an element of specific intent should be required before an accused may be criminally liable for the death of another. We do not address this issue, as Meyer raised it randomly, without elaboration or supportive authority. Soo Line R. Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a litigant's random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is not sufficient to raise the issue for our review). We note parenthetically that vehicular homicide is defined as an unintentional death caused by reckless driving in the statute under which Meyer was charged and convicted.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Meyer's motions for adjudication of law points and for directed verdict. We affirm Meyer's conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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