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State v. Lioen11/24/2004
the substantial detriment of a party litigant." State v. Matias, 74 Haw. 197, 203, 840 P.2d 374, 377 (1992) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
*9 HRE Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible where such evidence is probative of any other fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident.
The list of permissible purposes for the admission of "other bad acts" set forth in HRE Rule 404(b) is not intended to be exhaustive. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai'i 289, 300, 926 P.2d 194, 205 (1996). Under HRE Rule 404(b), any purpose for which bad-acts evidence is introduced is a proper purpose as long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove the defendant's criminal propensity. Id. at 300-01, 926 P.2d at 205-06 (citing United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C.Cir.1990)).
We reject Lioen's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Evans to testify about Lioen's second DWLSR-DUI conviction. This testimony was offered to prove Lioen's reckless state of mind regarding whether his license remained revoked or suspended for DUI-alcohol. That was a permissible purpose under HRE Rule 404(b). St. Clair, 101 Hawai'i at 287- 88, 67 P.3d at 786-87 (holding that evidence is admissible under HRE Rule 404(b) to prove the defendant's reckless state of mind). Evan's testimony provided proof that Lioen knew that his license had been suspended or revoked for DUI-alcohol in the past and that he knew he did not have a valid driver's license when he drove his truck on October 11, 2001. As we previously concluded, such evidence was highly probative of Lioen's reckless state of mind.
Lioen speculates that the trial judge could have improperly considered Evans' testimony as proof of Lioen's criminal propensity--that because Lioen had committed the offense of DWLSR-DUI on a prior occasion, he was more likely to have committed the offense on this occasion. For this reason, Lioen contends that the probative value of this testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Lioen's claim is without merit. In a bench trial, we presume that the judge was not influenced by incompetent evidence. State v. Antone, 62 Haw. 346, 353, 615 P.2d 101, 107 (1980). This means that when evidence is admissible for a limited purpose, we presume that the judge only considered the evidence for the permissible purpose. State v. Montgomery, 103 Hawai'i 373, 383, 82 P.3d 818, 828 (App.2003); People v. Deenadayalu, 772 N.E.2d 323, 329 (Ill.App.Ct.2002). Lioen's argument would turn the established rule on its head by having us presume that the trial judge considered Evan's testimony for a purpose specifically forbidden by HRE Rule 404(b). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Evan's testimony.
D. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Show That Lioen Had Been Driving His Truck.
*10 Finally, Lioen claims that there was insufficient evidence to show that he had operated the truck on October 11, 2001, prior to being spotted by Officer Taguma. This claim has no merit.
The State introduced substantial evidence that Lioen had driven the truck. The evidence showed that when Officer Taguma first observed the truck, it was stopped in the middle of High Street, obstructing one lane of the two-lane roadway. The truck must have moved by some means to arrive at the middle of the street. The obvious inference was that it had been driven there.
Officer Taguma saw Lioen get out of the driver's side of the stalle
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