State v. Anger9/30/2004
oesn't say the driver, it doesn't say the person involved or the person in the other vehicle, it says person.
So the [c]ourt construes that to mean that to be the driver of the vehicle, such as [Anger], or perhaps a person in another vehicle who was injured as well.
Now, when you look further under subsection [ (c) ] [of HRS § 286-163], it says: In the event of a collision. And, obviously, here we have a motor vehicle accident upcountry, so there was a collision. Secondly: Did it result in injury or death[?] **636 *429 Per the officer from his preliminary investigation with the doctor there was injury.
And [HRS § 286-163(c) ] states further: And the police had probable cause to believe that a person involved in the incident has committed a violation. And I think for these purposes the only [statute] that is applicable would be [HRS § ] 291-4....
[HRS § 286-163(d) ] states further: The police shall--and I reiterate [,] it says shall, it doesn't say may, it doesn't say perhaps, it says: shall request the sample of blood or urine be recovered from the driver or any other person suspected of committing a violation of Section 291-4. And apparently the request, doesn't say necessarily of the defendant, but it says: the request shall be made to the hospital ... or medical facility treating the person from whom the police request the blood or urine be recovered.
So, based on [HRS § ] 286-163, the [c]ourt does find that the procedure on the particular evening, based on the facts that there was a collision, there was injury to Mr. Anger, there was probable cause to believe Mr. Anger was involved in [a violation of HRS § ] 291-4, that being the observations of intoxication by ... both officers, as well as [Anger] admitting that he drank three Ali[']i brand beers, the [c]ourt does find that the police had reason to go ahead and draw blood from the ... driver, from Mr. Anger.
So, based on those factors, the [c]ourt is going to go ahead and deny the motion to suppress the results of the blood test.
(Emphases added.)
Following the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, Anger entered a conditional plea of no contest on November 2, 2001, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. [FN10] On November 30, 2001, Anger timely filed a notice of appeal.
FN10. Anger was originally charged, in Count II, with inattention to driving without due care, in violation of HRS § 291-12. Upon entry of Anger's conditional plea of no contest, however, the prosecution amended Count II to a charge of lack of due care, in violation of Maui County Code § 10.52.010.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion To Suppress
"We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the case.... Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the 'right/wrong' standard." State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000) (citations, some quotation signals, and some ellipsis points omitted). Accordingly, "[w]e review the circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was 'right' or 'wrong.' " Id. (citations and some quotation signals omitted).
State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38, 47, 79 P.3d 131, 140 (2003) (quoting State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 203, 58 P.3d 1242, 1250 (2002) (quoting State v. Poaipuni, 98 Hawai'i 387, 392, 49 P.3d 353, 358 (2002))).
B. The Admissibility Of Evidence
The admissibility of evidence requires different standards of review depending on the particular rule of evidence at issue. State v. Pulse, 83 Hawai'i 229, 246, 925 P.2d 797, 814 (1996). When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate revie
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