State v. Anger9/30/2004
that the physician had advised him that Anger had sustained injuries.
HRE Rule 803(b)(3) (1993) sets forth the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule, which allows the evidentiary admission of
statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(Emphases added). "At the outset, we point out that '[t]he state of mind exception, by definition, focuses on the sensory impressions of the declarant where those impressions are relevant to an issue in the case.' " State v. Canady, 80 Hawai'i 469, 476, 911 P.2d 104, 111 (App.1996) (quoting State v. Feliciano, 2 Haw.App. 633, 636, 638 P.2d 866, 869 (1982)) (emphasis added). The prosecution's argument thus overlooks the fact that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule applies only to a "statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind," HRE Rule 803(b)(3) (emphasis added), and the anonymous physician, not Officer Silva, was the declarant of the statement that Anger had sustained injuries. Nevertheless, Officer Silva's testimony that an anonymous physician had told him that Anger had sustained injuries was the purported and sole statutory predicate, under HRS § 286-163, for the involuntary draw of Anger's blood. Therefore, Officer Silva's testimony was obviously adduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, inasmuch as the legal justification under HRS § 286-163(c) for such an involuntary draw depended upon proving that Anger had, in fact, suffered injury in the motor vehicle accident. Officer Silva's testimony was the only evidence adduced at the suppression hearing that was probative of whether Anger in fact had been injured in the motor vehicle accident: the anonymous physician was not called to testify at the suppression hearing; no evidence was adduced as to the nature of Anger's alleged injuries; and no medical records were proffered.
**639 *432 HRS § 286-163 authorizes an involuntary blood draw only "in the event of a collision resulting in injury or death." Thus, the plain language of the statute requires that there be an actual injury, a fact that the prosecution bore the burden of proving in order to avail itself of HRS § 286-163. Although lay persons may be competent to testify as percipient witnesses to the presence of a personal injury, Officer Silva never purported to testify regarding his personal perceptions of Anger's condition. To the contrary, the prosecution used Officer Silva as a conduit for injecting into the record what a presumably available, out-of-court declarant had allegedly stated regarding the very fact at issue in the present matter, i.e., whether Anger had sustained injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Hence, Officer Silva's belief, reasonable or otherwise, that Anger had been injured (that is, his "state of mind"), without more, was immaterial in evaluating whether the requirements of HRS § 286-163 had been met.
Absent an injury, Officer Silva was required to comply with the statutory provisions of HRS § 286-151, see supra note 5, which authorizes a breath, blood, or urine test, pursuant to the implied consent statute, "only after ... [a] lawful arrest[ ] and ... [t]he [arrested] person has been informed by a police officer of the sanctions [imposed] under part XIV and [HRS §§ ] 286- 151.5 and 286-157.3" and HRS § 286-151.5, which provides that, "[i]f a person ... refuses to submit to a breath or blood test, none shall be given, except as provided in [HRS § ] 286-163[.]" Absent proof of an act
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