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State v. Marshall5/21/2002
604 N.W.2d 396 (2000). In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 261 Neb. 783, 626 N.W.2d 518 (2001).
We observe that Nebraska's version of Fed. R. Evid. 902, § 27-902(1) and (4), is almost exactly the same as the federal version. In the instant case, regarding the liberal admissibility of documents pursuant to the federal version of § 27-902, the district court stated in its judgment on appeal:
"In the case of innumerable writings which almost invariably correctly show their origins on their face, the slight obstacle to fraud presented by authentication requirements is far outweighed by the time and expense of proving authenticity. The danger of injustice and delay is greater than the danger of forgery. Rule 902 covers such documents which experience has proved generally reliable in showing their own authenticity.
"Fortifying circumstances - difficulty, ease of detection and criminal sanctions - generally make the danger of forgery very slight in connection with this limited class of self-authenticating documents. In view of the slight danger of forgery, it is unnecessary to require the proponent to furnish further evidence of authenticity, especially in the situations where there 'is great inconvenience amounting sometimes to practical impossibility.' In some cases, the facts that would provide further evidence of authenticity are within the knowledge of the opponent of the evidence, making it even more unfair to require the proponent to present this evidence.
"The trial judge should, therefore, not use his [or her] discretion to exclude documents coming within Rule 902's classifications. The opponents of the evidence are in no way precluded from contesting authenticity and evidence may be presented to the jury to be considered in deciding how much weight to give the document; they are only precluded from disputing admissibility on the ground of authentication." 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 902 (1982).
Utilizing this law, we agree that the trial court did not err in receiving exhibit 27 into evidence. We conclude that there is no requirement under either § 25-1285 or § 27-902 that every page of a document be certified. Rather, given that exhibit 27 was offered as a single document, certification on the first page was sufficient.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that the district court did not err in affirming the trial court's admission of exhibit 27. Therefore, the trial court was correct in using exhibit 27 to enhance Marshall's current conviction to second-offense DUI. We affirm Marshall's conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
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