State v. Wallace7/22/2004
It was only in the context of being asked whether Wallace was "crowded or restrained by officers" that Officer Adachi replied in the negative, explaining, "I actually just told him to stand on the side, and we kept doing what we had to do with the vehicle." The record, therefore, reflects that Officer Adachi instructed Wallace "to stand on the side" not for the purpose of detaining Wallace, but so that he could continue the investigation without Wallace getting in the way.
As for the fact that Officer Adachi did not advise Wallace that he was free to leave the scene during the encounter:
Though informing a suspect that he is not under arrest is one factor frequently considered to show lack of custody, see, e.g., [Oregon v.] Mathiason, 429 U.S. [492,] 495 [97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714] [ (1977) ]; [United States v.] Stanley, 597 F.2d [866,] 869 [ (4th Cir.1979) ], it is not a talismanic factor. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Where[ ] ... the entire context indicates a lack of custody, failure to inform defendant of his status is not dispositive.
Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 171-72 (4th Cir.1985). In the instant case, the record evinces that (1) Wallace voluntarily approached Officers Adachi and Rowe to engage them in conversation regarding the vehicle, (2) Wallace's liberty of movement was not curtailed in any significant manner, (3) no force was used during the encounter, (4) Wallace was not moved to a different location or physically restrained, and (5) neither Officer Adachi nor Officer Rowe displayed a show of authority beyond that inherent in the mere presence of a police officer. Therefore, Wallace's assertion that he was not free to leave the scene is belied by the record. Rather, the entire context of the encounter plainly indicates a lack of custody.
Furthermore, we reject Wallace's contention that the very giving of Miranda rights essentially produced a custodial interrogation. Numerous courts have held, and we hereby agree, that the precaution of giving Miranda warnings in a noncustodial setting does not transform that setting into a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir.1998); Davis 778 F.2d at 171-72; United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694 n. 6 (5th Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863, 98 S.Ct. 193, 54 L.Ed.2d 137 (1977); State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 897 P.2d 152, 162-63 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 79 P.3d 169 (2003); State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D.1991); State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 258 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1979). In this case, the totality of the circumstances compels us to conclude for the reasons discussed supra that an innocent person in Wallace's position could not reasonably have believed that he or she was under arrest at the time of the encounter with Officers Adachi and Rowe.
As previously indicated, Wallace has the burden of proving custody. Naititi, 104 Hawai'i at 235, 87 P.3d at 904 (quoting Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i at 118, 34 P.3d at 1017). Inasmuch as an objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances fails to reflect either that (1) Wallace had become impliedly accused of committing a crime because Officer Adachi's questions became sustained and coercive, such that they were no longer reasonably designed briefly to confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion or (2) the point of arrest had arrived because Wallace was subjected to unlawful de facto arrest without probable cause to do so, we hold that Wallace fails to sustain his burde
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Hawaii DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|