State v. Wallace7/22/2004
n of proof.
B. Assuming Wallace was in Custody, Whether he Validly Waived his Miranda Rights
Additionally, even assuming that Wallace was in custody for Miranda purposes, *1286 we hold that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. The circuit court's ruling that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that Wallace waived his Miranda rights is founded on Wallace's refusal to execute a written waiver of rights. Relying on this court's decision in State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 881 P.2d 504 (1994), the circuit court determined that Wallace's refusal to sign the waiver of rights portion of Form 103, followed by his agreement to nevertheless talk with police, amounted to an ambiguous and equivocal waiver of rights requiring clarification by Officer Adachi. We disagree.
In Hoey, the defendant, Hoey, indicated during the course of being advised of his Miranda rights in a custodial interrogation that he did not have money to "buy" a lawyer. 77 Hawai'i at 22, 881 P.2d at 509. On appeal, Hoey claimed that this statement should have been construed to be a request for counsel because it demonstrated that he did not understand his right to court-appointed legal representation. Id. at 33-34, 881 P.2d at 520-21. In addressing this contention, the court in Hoey began its analysis with the proposition that
if a defendant makes an unequivocal request for counsel while being "Mirandized," all questioning must terminate until counsel is present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626-27. In other words,
once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police interrogators only through counsel, he cannot be further questioned until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378] ... (1981); State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 566, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985); State v. Brezee, 66 Haw. 162, 657 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1983).
This principle creates a bright-line rule that once the right to counsel has been invoked[,] all questioning must cease. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 [105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488] ... (1984) (per curiam). See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 [104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343, 79 L.Ed.2d 579] ... (1984).
State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987).
Id. at 34, 881 P.2d at 521 (brackets, ellipses points, and emphasis in original).
The Hoey court observed, however, that:
The cases cited above[ ] ... do not reach the issue of a defendant's equivocal invocation of Miranda rights, and the jurisdictions that have addressed it are split into three camps regarding whether cessation of questioning is required or whether the interrogating police officer may seek to clarify the meaning of a defendant's ambiguous statements. Those in the first camp have held that a defendant's ambiguous expression of interest in the presence of an attorney requires that further questioning cease altogether. Those in the second have required clarifying questions with regard to the defendant's comprehension or waiver of the right to counsel as a necessary precondition to further substantive questioning. Those in the third have found an effective waiver despite an ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel.
Id. at 34-35, 881 P.2d at 521-22 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Hoey court observed further that, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court unqualifiedly sided with the third camp. Id. at 35, 881 P.2d at 522.
On the issue raised by Hoey, this court held:
we choose to afford our
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