State v. Wallace7/22/2004
ights precludes a valid waiver in this case. Hoey is, therefore, non-dispositive.
Turning to the issue of waiver, it is well established that, "[a]fter a defendant has been adequately apprised of his 'Miranda' rights, he 'may waive [effectuation of] these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.' " State v. Luton, 83 Hawai'i 443, 454, 927 P.2d 844, 855 (1996) (quoting State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 478, 747 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1987) (citation omitted)) (brackets in original). To determine whether a valid waiver was given, this court must once again "examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances." State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai'i 403, 406, 886 P.2d 740, 743 (1994).
In the present matter, notwithstanding that Wallace refused to sign the waiver of rights portion of Form 103, it is uncontroverted, *1288 and the circuit court found in FOF 37, that "[Wallace] stated he was willing to talk to police [,] but he was not signing the form." [FN6] This court has observed that "an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda case." State v. Henderson, 80 Hawai'i 439, 442 911 P.2d 74, 77 (1996) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Butler, 441 U.S. at 370-71, 99 S.Ct. 1755, the defendant, after being orally advised of his Miranda rights, refused to sign a written waiver form, stating "I will talk to you but I am not signing any form." Nevertheless, the defendant agreed to speak with officers, thereafter making inculpatory statements. Id. at 371, 99 S.Ct. 1755.
FN6. On cross-examination, when asked how he determined that Wallace was still willing to speak to him, notwithstanding his (Wallace's) refusal to execute the waiver of rights portion of MPD Form 103, Officer Adachi stated:
I asked him if he wanted--if he was willing to sign. He refused. He said no, I'm not signing it. So I asked him if he was willing to talk to us--he wanted to talk to us or wanted to sign the form. And he said he would talk to us, but he wasn't signing the form.
The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's rejection of the written waiver did not preclude a finding that the suspect had waived his rights, reasoning:
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. ... The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.
Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (emphases added). [FN7]
FN7. As noted by the Court in Butler, the federal courts have unanimously rejected the claim that refusal to sign a written waiver form precludes a finding of waiver. Id. at 375 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 1755.
Our examination of the record compels us to conclude that Wallace knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, the record reflects that Wallace was "adequately and effectively apprised of his rights." Butler, 441 U.S. at 374, 99 S.Ct. 1755. Indeed, as previously indicated, Wallace does not dispute that he understood the warnings given to him. Furthermore, it is compelling to specify what the record in
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