State v. Wallace7/22/2004
da, consists of "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (footnote omitted); see also [State v.] Hoey, 77 Hawai'i [17,] 33, 881 P.2d [504,] 520 [ (1994) ] ("the privilege [against self-incrimination] is jeopardized when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom by the authorities in any significant way and subjected to questioning") (citations, original ellipsis points, and internal quotations signals omitted); State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 481, 643 P.2d 541, 543 (1982); State v. Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 359, 581 P.2d 752, 754 (1978). In other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of his or her statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it, must establish that his or her statement was the result of (1) "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was (2) "in custody." See, e.g., [State v.] Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i [207,] 210, 10 P.3d [728,] 731 [ (2000) ] ("the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by 'two criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody' " (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 204, 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 Haw. 583, 586, 752 P.2d 99, 100 (1988))) (original brackets omitted)).
State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 117-18, 34 P.3d 1006, 1016-18 (2001) (emphases and some brackets added) (footnotes omitted).
As previously indicated, the circuit court found, and the prosecution does not dispute, that Wallace was not in custody the *1282 first time he approached Officers Adachi and Rowe. Additionally, with respect to the second time Wallace approached Officers Adachi and Rowe, the prosecution does not dispute that Wallace was subject to interrogation. Our inquiry, therefore, focuses strictly on whether Wallace was in custody during his second encounter with Officers Adachi and Rowe for purposes of triggering the protections afforded by Miranda.
"To determine whether 'interrogation' is 'custodial,' we look to the totality of the circumstances, focusing on 'the place and time of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions asked, the conduct of the police, and [any] other relevant circumstances.' " Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (quoting Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481, 643 P.2d at 544) (brackets in original). Again, the question to be answered, once it is determined that a defendant has been "interrogated" within the meaning of article I, section 10, is whether the defendant, at the time of the "interrogation," was "in[ ] custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom ... in any significant way[.]" Hoey, 77 Hawai'i at 33, 881 P.2d at 520 (citations omitted).
Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i at 122, 34 P.3d at 1021 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
"[N]o precise line can be drawn" delineating when "custodial interrogation," as opposed to non-custodial "on-the-scene" questioning (which is outside the protection against self-incrimination that article I, section 10 affords to an accused), has occurred. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (citations, internal quotation signals, and original brackets omitted). "Rather, the question whether a person has been significantly deprived of his or her freedom, such that he or she is 'in custody' at the time he or she is 'interrogated,' must be addressed on a case-by-case basis 'because each case must necessarily turn upon its own facts and circumstances.' " Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i at 123, 34 P.3d at 1022 (quoting Patterson, 59 Haw. at 362, 581 P.2d at 756).
However, as explained by the Ketchum court:
Nonetheless, we discern a poi
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Hawaii DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|