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State v. Hamilton4/12/2002
ontrary, it was apparent that the crime was quite calculated and cold-blooded as the perpetrator cleverly tried to make it appear like suicide.
As aptly noted by the majority, the fact that appellant smoked marijuana has no probative value and could only be prejudicial to him. Similarly, there is nothing probative or relevant about appellant's alleged attempt to purchase crack cocaine on the night of the murder. Neither is there anything relevant about the fact that appellant may have, in the past, been under the influence of a drug known as "wet." As just explained, the particulars surrounding the murder do not suggest that a drug-addled individual killed the victim, or that the murder was committed to obtain money for drugs.
Accordingly, all evidence that appellant may have been a "drugie" is not probative or relevant to anything except bad character. As a result, it was highly prejudicial and, thus, inadmissible unless it was somehow connected to the commission of the crime. Otherwise, it was utterly irrelevant to the determination of guilt and should have been excluded as being merely evidence of bad character. Evid.R. 403.
As has been discussed, much of the circumstantial evidence against appellant was either flawed or compromised in its presentation to the jury. Most of that flawed evidence went to prove that appellant was a "mad dog" who deserved to be convicted based on general principles and not by specific proof. Worse, these prejudicial errors were not counter-balanced by overwhelming evidence of guilt. For example, the alleged admission to the police that they might as well take him to jail is not exactly the admission of guilt on which one would want to base a guilty verdict. Given the hardened, street-smart history of appellant, it could simply represent a very accurate assessment of his situation, as opposed to a confession. And, as previously discussed, the fingerprint connected him to the murder weapon, but not necessarily to the crime itself.
I express no opinion with respect to appellant's guilt or innocence in this matter. Certainly he was a likely suspect. If I had been the prosecutor, I probably would have gone to trial as well. Let the jury sort out and weigh the evidence. However, it was the job of the trial court to insure that the testimony submitted to the jury was relevant and admissible evidence. The law rightfully does not allow proof of guilt to be based primarily on proof of bad character.
Furthermore, absent the cumulative effect, I agree that any single error may not have been enough to reverse appellant's conviction. However, in the absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt, significant doubt is created with respect to this jury's verdict when the cumulative effect of the errors is shown. Therefore, I reluctantly concur in the judgment of the majority.
JUDGE JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY
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