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State v. Kahawai2/6/2004
t." Id. at 71, 806 P.2d at 410.
The ICA majority analogized Morris to the present case and concluded that "[s]imilarly, even though [Petitioner's] alleged alcohol and substance abuse habits are not directly related to her crimes, the court was authorized to impose special conditions of probation" 3, 4, and 5. Majority opinion at 487, 83 P.3d at 750, 2003 WL 22969301. As the dissent in the ICA decision indicated, there was no factual "basis of information" presented regarding Petitioner's substance abuse problem. Dissenting opinion at 489, 83 P.3d at 752, 2003 WL 22969301. In contrast, the holding in Morris was based on a pre-sentence report which was replete with facts justifying the imposition of the conditions there:
[The defendant] admitted ... that he smoked six joints of marijuana daily, with his last use being between 1984-1985. He also revealed that he started drinking at about age 12, drinking an average of 14 cans of beer a day. Although he reported that he stopped drinking in 1986, Appellant indicated that he had been drinking at the time of the offense; he had consumed about five beers.
72 Haw. at 68-69, 806 P.2d at 409.
V.
With due respect, the ICA's holding would nullify the language of HRS § 706-624(2) which describes the manner in which the sentencing court must exercise its discretion in ordering discretionary conditions. The court had no basis, other than the unsubstantiated argument of the prosecutor, in determining that substance abuse conditions were warranted. The argument of the prosecutor alone would be an insufficient basis upon which the court may rationally exercise its discretion. There was no factual basis in the record upon which to support the conclusions that Petitioner's case warranted conditions "reasonably related" or necessary pursuant to HRS § 706-606 and 706-606(2).
Without some factual grounds in the record, there can be no rational exercise of the court's discretion. Of course, on remand the sentencing court is not precluded on its own **731 *468 motion from ordering a PSI. See HRS § 706-601(2). Accordingly, the ICA's opinion is reversed, the court's April 16, 2002 sentence is vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing.
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