State v. Owens4/10/2002
admonished the jury that the videotape itself was the primary evidence, and that the jury should rely on what they heard, rather than what they read. The trial court finally permitted Owens' counsel to highlight any areas in the transcript which Owens contended were inaccurate. In areas where there was a dispute concerning accuracy, the trial court found that the problem was insignificant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion allowing the jury to view the transcript.
[ .] 8. Whether the trial court should have excluded evidence of Owens' escape.
[ .] Owens escaped from jail six days after he was charged with murder. The trial court admitted this evidence over Owens' objection. The admissibility of escape evidence is subject to the rule of relevancy, SDCL 19-12-2 (Rule 402), and the related rule of prejudice versus probative value, SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403). A trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumed correct and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Perovich, 2001 SD 96, , 632 NW2d 12, 15.
[ .] Although we have not previously considered the admissibility of an escape, we have concluded that failure to appear and flight are both admissible to show consciousness of guilt. State v. Fast Horse, 490 NW2d 496 (SD 1992); State v. Waller, 338 NW2d 288 (1983); and Marshall v. State, 305 NW2d 838 (SD 1981). Other jurisdictions apply the same rule for escape. People v. Box, 5 P3d 130, 164 (Cal 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Box v. California, 532 US 963, 121 SCt 1497, 149 LE2d 383 (2001); State v. Middleton, 998 SW2d 520, 528-529 (Mo 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Middleton v Missouri; State v. Knighten, 569 NW2d 770, 772-773 (WisApp 1997); Macias v. State, 673 So2d 176, 184 (Fla 1996), review denied, 680 So2d 423 (1996); Clay v. State, 883 SW2d 822, 829 (Ark 1994); People v. Wilson, 628 NE2d 472, 483 (Ill 1993), appeal denied, 633 NE2d 14 (1994); Williams v. State, 832 SW2d 152, 154 (TexApp -- Houston 1992). In United States v. Hawkins, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted "no distinction that would warrant an analytical approach [to escape that would be] different from that used in flight cases. Flight and escape are similar acts." 931 F2d 1256, 1261 (8thCir 1991). We adopted that analysis in Waller, 338 NW2d at 292 (a failure to appear case). We now find that escape is analytically similar to flight in proving consciousness of guilt.
[ .] Under the flight/escape analysis, there must be a sufficient temporal connection. An inference of guilt may be drawn from the fact of flight (escape) if that act occurs "immediately after the commission of a crime, or after [a defendant] is accused of a crime that has been committed." Waller, 338 NW2d at 292 (citing United States v. White, 488 F2d 660, 662 (8thCir 1973) (emphasis in original)). Here, the time between Ross' death, Owens' charges, and his subsequent escape was very close. There was a sufficient temporal connection.
[ .] Owens, however, argues that even if escape evidence reflects an accused's consciousness of guilt, escape is primarily relevant only where the accused denies any involvement in the crime. Because Owens did not deny that he caused Ross' death, he contends that his escape was not relevant. We disagree.
[ .] We have previously stated that " n attempt by the accused to flee following commission of the alleged crime is circumstantially relevant to prove not only commission of the act, but also the intent and purpose with which it was committed." (emphasis added). Fast Horse, 490 NW2d at 501. Because Owens' intent and purpose were at issue, his escape was relevant.
[ .] Owens also objected to the specific escape evidence that was actually ad
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