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Greist v. State10/7/2005
As revised on rehearing
No. 2014
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
In 2003, Sugar R. Greist was convicted of third-degree assault, a class C felony. Greist was a first felony offender. Under Alaska sentencing law at that time, there was no presumptive term of imprisonment for first felony offenders convicted of class C felonies. However, Greist's sentencing was governed by former Alaska Statute 12.55.125(k)(2). This statute declared that, in the absence of one or more of the aggravating factors defined in AS 12.55.155(c), or extraordinary circumstances as defined in AS 12.55.165, a first felony offender convicted of a class C felony could not receive more than 2 years to serve - the presumptive term established for second felony offenders convicted of class C felonies.
At Greist's original sentencing, the superior court imposed a sentence that entailed less than 2 years to serve: 36 months with 27 months suspended (i.e., 9 months to serve). However, Greist later violated the conditions of his probation, and the superior court imposed the previously suspended 27 months of imprisonment. Thus, following his probation revocation, Greist's sentence for third-degree assault totaled 3 years to serve - 1 year more than the 2-year ceiling prescribed by former AS 12.55.125(k)(2).
In this appeal, Greist contends that this 3-year sentence is illegal under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington because he never received a jury trial on any aggravating factors.
Under Blakely, a defendant normally has a right to jury trial, and a right to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whenever the defendant's sentencing ceiling hinges on disputed issues of fact. However, Blakely exempts a defendant's prior convictions from this rule. In Greist's case, the record discloses (and Greist does not dispute) that he was previously adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for conduct that would have been a felony if committed by an adult. This is an aggravating factor under AS 12.55.155(c)(19). And, for the reasons explained here, we conclude that this aggravating factor falls within Blakely's exception for prior convictions.
Thus, the superior court was authorized to rely on this aggravating factor without holding a jury trial. And, based on this aggravating factor, the superior court was authorized to exceed the normal sentencing ceiling of 2 years to serve, codified in former AS 12.55.125(k)(2).
Factual and Procedural Background
Greist's conviction of assault in the third degree arose from events which occurred on February 1, 2003. According to the presentence report, Greist forced a 15-year-old boy to drink alcoholic beverages, and then Greist took the boy riding on a snow machine, even though Greist himself was intoxicated. Greist drove the snow machine over a cliff, injuring himself and the boy. The boy suffered severe injuries as a result of this crash. When Greist was taken into custody, his blood alcohol level was measured at .163 percent - more than twice the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle.
Greist had a prior misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated.
He also had been adjudicated a delinquent minor several times.
Greist reached a plea agreement with the State in which he pleaded no contest to third-degree assault, a class C felony. Because Greist was a first felony offender, he was not subject to a presumptive term of imprisonment. However, as explained above, his sentencing was governed by former AS 12.55.125(k)(2), which set a ceiling of 2 years to serve unless the State proved one or mo
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