 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Greist v. State10/7/2005
>
So, therefore, I am going to revoke the [previously] suspended 27 months. All time is revoked.
Greist now appeals this sentence. Greist argues that the superior court's sentencing procedure was unlawful - that Judge Erlich violated Greist's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as interpreted in Blakely. Greist also argues that even if the sentencing procedure was lawful, his sentence is excessive.
The Blakely Issue
Greist points out that, under former AS 12.55.125(k)(2), Judge Erlich could not sentence him to a term of imprisonment exceeding 2 years to serve unless the judge found one or more of the aggravating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(c) or extraordinary circumstances as defined in AS 12.55.165. Greist argues that, under Blakely v. Washington, he was entitled to a jury trial regarding any proposed aggravating factors - and that, because no jury trial was ever held on any aggravating factors, Judge Erlich had no authority to exceed the statutory ceiling of 2 years to serve when he revoked Greist's probation.
We agree with Greist that, under former AS 12.55.125(k)(2), Judge Erlich could not impose a sentence entailing more than 2 years to serve unless one or more aggravating factors were proved. The next question is whether Blakely applies to Greist's case. Greist's original criminal judgment was already final when Blakely was decided, but Greist's probation revocation was not final when Blakely was decided. Because of this, Greist argues that he is entitled to the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely to the extent that it affects the legality of his probation revocation and his resulting amended sentence.
We conclude that we need not decide this issue. Even if Blakely applied to defendants in Greist's situation, the sentencing proceedings in Greist's case did not violate Blakely.
As we explained above, Blakely expressly exempts a defendant's prior convictions from the requirement of jury trial. That is, when a defendant's prior conviction is the fact that authorizes a sentencing judge to exceed an otherwise applicable sentencing limit, the sentencing judge can rely on that prior conviction despite the normal Blakely requirement of a jury trial.
One obvious rationale for this exception is the fact that in the case of a prior conviction, the defendant's rights to jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt have already been honored. As we recently explained in Edmonds v. State:
For defendant to be convicted of crime ... , one of three things had to happen: either (1) the defendant exercised right to trial by jury, and the jury found the defendant guilty; or (2) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived it, choosing instead to be tried by a judge, and the judge found the defendant guilty; or (3) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived trial altogether, choosing instead to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. Regardless of how the defendant was found guilty, the defendant's right to jury trial and the defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt were both honored - and thus Blakely is satisfied.
The same thing is true with respect to juvenile delinquency adjudications under Alaska law. The standard of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings is "beyond a reasonable doubt." And in R.L.R. v. State, our supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution guarantees a right of jury trial to any minor who is alleged to be delinquent based on conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime carrying a penalty of incarceration.
Thus, under the Alaska Constitution, whenever a minor is alleged to be delinquent based on co
Page 1 2 3 4 Alaska DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|