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D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co.11/21/2001
f others was completely responsible for the happening of the first accident. However, as with medical negligence cases, the accident or event giving rise to the initial injuries merely creates the occasion for the second impact or action to occur.
We agree that to automatically compare the fault of the driver in causing the accident with the fault of the automobile manufacturer for the subsequent enhanced injury would be, as Reichert explains, to confuse two different causes-the cause of the accident and the cause of the enhanced injury. See Reichert, Limitations on Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision Actions, supra, at 117-18. The essential point is that under the crashworthiness doctrine, as in medical malpractice cases, the initial collision and its separate cause is always presumed, and the cause of the initial collision is simply not at issue in the determination of the cause of the second collision. Instead, any analysis concerning the causal connection of the second collision to the separately claimed damages depends solely upon whether a defect existed and gave rise to the enhanced injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Intentional Tort Exception to Comparative Fault
The estate and D'Amario also contend that even if we were to hold that the comparative fault principles of section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1997), apply to crashworthiness cases, we should hold that this case falls within the intentional tort exception to section 768.81. Section 768.81(4)(b) states that the comparative fault statute does not apply "to any action based upon an intentional tort." Id. § 768.81(4)(b). They urge this Court to approve Nash's holding that drunk driving constitutes an intentional tort under this exception. We decline to do so.
In holding that drunk driving is an intentional tort, the court in Nash relied on this Court's reasoning in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1976), wherein we stated that " riving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional act which creates known risks to the public." However, the sole issue in that negligence case was whether the jury should be allowed to consider a claim for punitive damages based on the defendant's negligent conduct of driving while intoxicated. See id. at 923. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's intoxication and erratic driving provided the egregiousness necessary for an award of punitive damages. This Court agreed, holding that "the voluntary act of driving `while intoxicated' evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked to provide an award of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensatory damages." Id. at 924. Hence, our ruling in Ingram was directed to the showing required to justify an award of punitive damages, and not to the issue of whether the cause of action constituted an intentional tort. Once the Court's above-mentioned statements concerning the intentional act of drunk driving are placed in proper context, it is apparent that Ingram does not stand for the proposition that driving while intoxicated is an intentional tort. Indeed, the Court's reasoning was applied in a case based on negligent conduct albeit it was claimed that the negligent driving took place because of the alleged intoxication.
This Court has defined an intentional tort as one in which the actor exhibits a deliberate intent to injure or engages in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000). In Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972), this Court explained the difference between negligence and intentional torts. Relying on Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965
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