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D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co.11/21/2001
), we explained:
Where a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it. . . . However, the knowledge and appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. Thus, the distinction between intent and negligence boils down to a matter of degree. "Apparently the line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable man would avoid (negligence), and become a substantial certainty." Id. at 817 (quoting William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 32 (3d ed. 1964)) (footnote omitted).
While acting under the influence of alcohol may sometimes justify an award of punitive damages against the offender, we cannot conclude that negligent conduct induced by the use of alcohol constitutes an independent intentional tort under our "substantially certain" test for intentional torts. Accordingly, we reject the estate and D'Amario's contention that driving while intoxicated is an independent intentional tort. Cf. Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc., 879 P.2d 538, 545 n.9 (Haw. 1994) ("The act of driving under the influence is clearly a negligent act[.]"); People v. Townsend, 183 N.W. 177, 179 (Mich. 1921) (noting that driving an automobile while intoxicated is "gross and culpable negligence"); Stinson v. Daniel, 414 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tenn. 1967) (noting that driving while drunk constitutes wanton negligence). Hence, we do not find that the intentional tort exception to the comparative fault statute may be invoked.
No Liability For Initial Accident
We are not unmindful of the concerns that a manufacturer not end up improperly being held liable for damages caused by the initial collision. Of course, we must remember that in crashworthiness cases the plaintiff not only has the burden of proving the existence of a defect and its causal relationship to her injuries, but she must also prove the existence of additional or enhanced injuries caused by the defect. In this regard, we are impressed with the reasoning of the federal district court in Jimenez that the proper application of the crashworthiness doctrine is also consistent with comparative fault principles. The major concern of those courts following the majority rule is in seeing that successive tortfeasors only be held liable for the damages they cause, and not be held liable for damages caused by the initial tortfeasor. We agree with this concern, but see no reason why it cannot be properly addressed, as in Jimenez, by a recognition of the crashworthiness doctrine's legal rationale limiting a manufacturer's liability only to those damages caused by the defect.
Further, when appropriate, the defendant manufacturer in a crashworthiness case will be entitled to have the jury told that no claim is being made for damages arising out of the initial accident, and that the manufacturer should not be held liable for damages caused by the initial collision. Indeed, such an instruction should ensure, much like our holding in Fabre, that no defendant will be held responsible for damages it did not cause. Such an instruction should have much the same effect as an instruction on comparative fault, but without the worrisome baggage of retrying the cause of the underlying accident in the crashworthiness case. As these cases illustrate, and as we have discussed above, trying both issues together can result in substantial confusion.
Juror Confusion
We also conclude that to inject the issue of the driver's fault in causing the initial accident into the trial of a crashworthiness case tends
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