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D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co.11/21/2001
crashworthiness cases. In such cases, the automobile manufacturer is solely responsible for the enhanced injuries to the extent the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of a defective condition and that the defect proximately caused the enhanced injuries. Thus, an automobile manufacturer who allegedly designed a defective product may not be held liable for damages caused by the initial collision and may not apportion its fault with the fault of the driver of the vehicle who caused the initial accident.
We believe this rule will ensure both fairness in the apportionment of damages and that the jury will not be unduly confused about the issues in the case, especially in cases like those before us today, where both accidents involved drinking and driving. Because the initial collision is presumed in crashworthiness cases, the jury's focus in such cases should be on whether a defect existed and whether such defect proximately caused the enhanced injuries. Unfortunately, in the consolidated cases, the juries' focus was shifted to the conduct of the intoxicated drivers who caused the initial accidents. In light of the confusion caused by the introduction of accident-causing fault and the improper focus placed on the non-party drivers' intoxication in each case, we conclude that both the estate and D'Amario are entitled to a new trial.
Accordingly, we quash the Second District's decision in D'Amario and approve the Third District's decision in Nash to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. We further disapprove the opinion in Kidron to the extent it is inconsistent with our holding herein.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I cannot agree with the majority's general holding, the adoption of either the purported majority or minority views as described by the majority opinion, or the application of Frank M. Stuart, M.D., P.A. v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977), to secondary injury products liability cases.
With respect to the majority's holding, I conclude that stating that comparative negligence "will not ordinarily apply" simply will be too difficult for trial judges to fairly administer. We have uniformly held that comparative negligence does apply in products liability cases since the adoption of strict liability in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976). The law on this issue was recently fully examined, explained, and reaffirmed in Standard Haven Products v. Benitez, 648 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1994).
Next, I do not find it necessary to adopt either the majority or minority rule because we already have sufficient rules to apply in these cases to resolve the main issue. In my view, the main issue presented by these consolidated cases is how to handle the state of intoxication of the other driver who causes the initial wreck. I recognize that the driver's intoxication has the potential of distorting these cases because the emotional nature detracts from the proper focus of the case, but a trial judge has the discretion under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2000), to control the evidence and ensure that the driver's intoxication does not misdirect the jury's proper focus. Thus, there is no need to add another set of rules to be followed. Furthermore, our recent decision in Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000), applies to many of these cases because usually there is a jury issue with regard to the proper apportionment of damages between the initial collision and the manuf
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