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D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co.11/21/2001
probative value associated with the presentation of the other driver's blood alcohol level was outweighed by the resulting prejudice. For these reasons, I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I would find that the Second District erred in reversing the trial court's ruling granting a new trial.
With regard to the consolidated case from the Third District, Nash v. General Motors Corp., 734 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), I concur with the majority that the Third District erred by finding drunk driving to be an intentional tort. However, I dissent from the majority's decision to approve Nash to the extent that it is consistent with the majority opinion. Nor do I join in disapproving Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding comparative negligence applies in strict liability suits regardless of whether injury occurred in primary or secondary accident). Instead, I would quash Nash and approve the Fourth District's recent decision in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Ferayorni, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1983, 1984 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 25, 2001) (finding error in trial court's refusal to instruct on comparative negligence in strictly liability case).
Judge Terry of Delaware set forth sound advice in Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997):
One must be careful to resist the temptation to view this issue in an isolated, over simplified way. Under some circumstances there may exist a clear line of demarcation between the injuries sustained as a result of the initial collision and those enhanced injuries arising from a defective product. The case of a driver running into a tree at a slow speed and being ejected from the car as the result of a defective seat belt, for instance, might create a situation where it is clear that no injuries would have occurred without the ejection. Under those kinds of facts the injuries are so distinct that application of the rule barring evidence of the driver's comparative negligence might be workable, even if not advisable.
However, most cases are not so clear cut. For instance, in the case at bar the plaintiff's car was hit by another vehicle at an intersectional collision. A dispute exists as to whether the plaintiff stopped at the stop sign. A dispute could exist as to whether the driver of the other vehicle was negligent in a way which contributed to the collision.
Plaintiff maintains that he would not have been injured at all except for the defective air bag which upon inflating crushed his fingers against the steering wheel. Ford denies that its air bag caused any of the injuries and says that the fingers were injured when the steering wheel spun around as a result of the collision. Here, it is obvious, we have potentially several acts of negligence, all of which might be proximate causes of the plaintiff's injuries.
Under this factual situation it would be difficult and confusing to instruct a jury that it should not consider the cause of the collision but only the cause of the enhanced injuries.
Another logical hurdle inherent in plaintiff's position is this. If a plaintiff negligently crashes his vehicle into a tree and suffers an enhanced injury because of a design defect in his car, plaintiff says that the manufacturer is liable for the enhanced injury regardless of the plaintiff's negligence in causing the collision. But what if a plaintiff collides with another vehicle and the driver of that vehicle is negligent? Assume also that the enhanced injuries caused to the plaintiff by a design defect in his car are clearly identifiable. Under ordinary rules of proximate cause the other driver would have
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