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People v. McNett10/14/2005
In 1999, defendant, Daniel J. McNett, entered into a plea agreement resolving three felony traffic cases then pending against him in Lake County. Certain terms of the sentence the court imposed on him under the agreement were more severe than authorized, and the court later voided those parts of the sentence. Defendant then moved to void the plea agreement, his convictions, and his whole sentence, contending that the void terms of the sentence make all of these void as well. The court denied that motion, and defendant appeals. We hold that the void portions of defendant's sentence were not essential terms of the plea agreement. Therefore, the agreement as a whole survived the voiding of those portions, and we need not decide whether defendant is correct that a void plea agreement results in void convictions. Defendant also disputes the validity of certain terms of his probation. That issue is moot, and we will not consider it. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On each of March 15, April 15, and April 30 of 1999, police arrested defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a suspended license. Those arrests led to indictments in three cases: Nos. 99--CF--1280, 99--CF--1472, and 99--CF--1521. In each case, the charges were one count of driving with a revoked license (enhanced) (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West 1998)) and one count of either aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-- 501(d)(1)(A) (West 1998)) or driving under the influence of alcohol (enhanced) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(c-1)(1) (West 1998)).
On August 6, 1999, defendant and the State agreed on the terms of a fully negotiated plea agreement. Defendant was to plead guilty to two counts of driving with a revoked license (enhanced), a misdemeanor count of driving with a revoked license, and two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (enhanced). The State would nol-pros the aggravated-driving-under-the -influence-of-alcohol count. In two of the cases, defendant would receive concurrent sentences of 30 months' imprisonment with work release. In the other, he would receive a sentence of 30 months' probation, to be served consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment. The conditions of the probation were to include 18 months' periodic imprisonment, restitution of $1,600 to Cheri Godock (whose car defendant damaged in the incident leading to the charges in No. 99--CF--1472), compliance with any orders of protection issued in favor of his ex-wife, and no contact with his ex-wife. In comments to the court, the State noted that the work release would allow defendant to get outpatient alcohol treatment under controlled conditions. After a conference under Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402), the court accepted the agreement and imposed the agreed sentences.
Upon his release from the Department of Corrections, defendant, acting sometimes pro se and sometimes through retained or appointed counsel, filed a flurry of motions. These included a "Motion to Vacate Sentence of Periodic Imprisonment," in which he contended that (1) any sentence of periodic imprisonment consecutive to a sentence of ordinary imprisonment is unauthorized, and (2), under section 5--7--1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5--7--1 (West 1998)), no sentence of periodic imprisonment in a county work-release facility may be longer than one year. The court agreed with defendant's second contention, and, over the State's objection, vacated the last 6 months of the 18 months of periodic imprisonment. However, it denied his motion to the extent that it sought to vacate the entire term of periodic imprisonment. Defendant appealed.
This court, in a published
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