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People v. Boand9/30/2005
ther-crimes evidence was irrelevant to defendant's modus operandi in committing the drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter, and there is little question that the prejudicial impact of the evidence was substantial.
We further conclude that the other-crimes evidence was irrelevant to defendant's motive, intent, and opportunity to commit drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. Nothing suggests that, on the night of the incident, defendant acted with homicidal or romantic motives regarding Levin. When defendant allegedly delivered the methadone to Levin and declined to assist her after the overdose, he did so without the desire or intent to kill or sexually assault her. However, defendant's delivery of sedatives to Brounstein and Semmen was allegedly motivated by his romantic interest in the women. The prejudicial impact of the other-crimes evidence greatly outweighed its relevance to the issues of defendant's motive, intent, and opportunity.
Finally, we conclude that the other-crimes evidence was irrelevant to the issue of identity. There was no question that defendant is the only person who could have assaulted Brounstein and Semmen as they alleged. Furthermore, it is unquestioned that defendant was present at his home on the night of Levin's death. The only question common to the other crimes and the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges is whether the offenses were committed. If defendant did not commit the offenses, then no crime was committed. Because there is no issue that Levin ingested defendant's methadone, the identity of the source of the methadone is not at issue. Moreover, the identity of the person who allegedly recklessly failed to assist Levin is not at issue. Identity was not at issue for the assaults of Brounstein and Semmen or for the homicides with which defendant was charged. Therefore, the prejudicial effect of the other-crimes evidence outweighed the probative value of proving identity.
C. Restriction of Cross-Examination on Witnesses' Motives to Testify
1. Shepherd
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of Shepherd's motive to testify against him. Defendant contends that, by testifying to her delay in summoning help for Levin, Shepherd exposed herself to criminal liability and would not have done so if she feared prosecution. At trial, defendant attempted to show that Shepherd's former attorney negotiated an agreement with the State, pursuant to which Shepherd would receive immunity in exchange for her testimony. Rather than calling the attorney as a defense witness, defense counsel attempted to introduce this agreement through the cross-examination of Shepherd, who was not a party to the alleged negotiations. The trial court barred the cross-examination, ruling that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel then presented a handwritten note in which the assistant State's Attorney stated: "This is to confirm that Tavia Shepherd is not going to be charged with any criminal offense as a result of the evening during which Ms. Levin died. Our office views her as a victim of the actions of Mr. Hoerer and [defendant]." The note postdated several of Shepherd's statements regarding the group's use of methadone on the night of the incident. The assistant State's Attorney stated that the note did not "suggest anything other than what it says, which is that [the State] did not view [Shepherd] as a potential defendant; that [the State] viewed her as a victim, period."
The right to cross-examine a witness concerning his biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives is protected by both t
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