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People v. Boand9/30/2005
te's cross-examination of Goldman exceeded the scope of the direct examination because the third conversation was "unrelated" to the other two conversations. In a related argument, defendant asserts that the third conversation was introduced for the truth of the matter asserted because " n reality, the State used the third conversation not to attack Goldman['s credibility], but rather to try to show that the defendant was telling Shepherd what to say during the conversation." In other words, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of the third telephone conversation because it supports an inference that defendant coached Shepherd to falsely report that Levin's death was a suicide.
Cross-examination is generally limited to the subject matter of the direct examination of the witness and to matters affecting the credibility of the witness. People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 498 (1998). However, courts should liberally construe this limitation to allow inquiry into whatever subject tends to explain, discredit, or destroy the witness's testimony. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at 498. The trial court is afforded latitude regarding the scope of cross-examination, and a reviewing court should not interfere absent a clear abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2000). Improper cross-examination is not reversible error if it can be considered harmless error. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 296 (1990). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the cross-examination regarding the third telephone conversation.
Shepherd's telephone conversations during the week following Levin's death were the subject of Goldman's direct examination. We conclude that the cross-examination of Goldman, and the introduction of the third conversation, does not exceed the scope of the direct examination because the third conversation relates to the other two conversations. See Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at 498. However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry.
Defendant further argues that the substance of the third conversation violates the rule against hearsay because it was essentially offered to prove that defendant instructed Shepherd to lie about Levin's cause of death. In a footnote, defendant's brief addresses the applicability of the completeness doctrine to Goldman's testimony regarding the third conversation. The completeness doctrine is an exception to the hearsay rule and provides that a party may introduce the balance of a writing or an oral statement that has been introduced by an opponent, for the purpose of explaining, qualifying, or otherwise shedding light on the statement. "However, the completeness doctrine restricts the admissibility of the balance of a statement already introduced ' "to what was said on the same subject at the same time." ' " People v. Brown, 249 Ill. App. 3d 986, 990 (1993), quoting People v. Hudson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 915, 924-25 (1990), quoting People v. Hosty, 146 Ill. App. 3d 876, 884 (1986). The completeness doctrine does not apply if the conversation discussed on direct examination was not a part of the conversation that the opposing party is attempting to introduce on cross-examination. Brown, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 990.
In People v. Brown, 249 Ill. App. 3d 986 (1993), the defendant made two oral statements at the police station approximately two weeks after the offense. The first statement was given to a sergeant and a detective investigating the crime. Approximately 1* hours later, the defendant made a second oral statement to the same detective and an assistant State's Attorney. The trial court allowed the assistant State's Attorney to testify to the second
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