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People v. Boand9/30/2005
t the same time, * the sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as determined by the court. * The court shall impose consecutive sentences if:
*
(ii) the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12--13 [(criminal sexual assault)], 12--14 [(aggravated criminal sexual assault)], or 12--14.1 [(predatory criminal sexual assault of a child)] of the Criminal Code of 1961[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a)(ii) (West 2004).
In this case, the requirements for mandatory consecutive sentences will be met if the trial court imposes multiple sentences for criminal sexual assault and for drug-induced homicide or involuntary manslaughter. See 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a)(ii) (West 2004).
I. Constitutionality of Drug-Induced-Homicide Statute
We decide that trial error requires us to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. However, we comment on defendant's allegation of unconstitutionality of the drug-induced-homicide statute because the issue likely will arise on remand. Defendant contends that the drug-induced-homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
A statute is presumed constitutional. The party challenging the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). A court has a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality if it can be done reasonably, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 418. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best indication of the legislature's intent is the language of the statute, which should be given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. People v. Jackson, 358 Ill. App. 3d 927, 933 (2005). The question of a statute's constitutionality is subject to de novo review. People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001).
A person commits drug-induced homicide if he "violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act [(the Act) (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2004))] by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person dies as a result of the injection, inhalation or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance." 720 ILCS 5/9--3.3(a) (West 2004). Section 401 of the Act provides that " xcept as authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to: (i) manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled or counterfeit substance or controlled substance analog." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2004)). Methadone is a Schedule II controlled substance under the Act (720 ILCS 570/202, 206(c)(14) (West 2004)), and defendant does not dispute that section 401 of the Act barred him from delivering methadone to Shepherd, Levin, or Hoerer.
1. Overbreadth
Defendant asserts that the drug-induced-homicide statute was designed to punish only "professional drug dealers" and, therefore, the possibility that anyone in the chain of delivery might be criminally liable renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.
" 'The doctrine of overbreadth is designed to protect first amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of the freedom.' " People v. Hill, 333 Ill. App. 3d 783, 786 (2002), quoting People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 226 (1995). "A statute regulating conduct is overbroad if it (1) criminalizes a substantial amount of protected behavior, relative to the law's plainly legitimate sweep; and (2) is not susceptible to a limiting construction th
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