People v. Boand9/30/2005
at avoids constitutional problems." Hill, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 786. When considering a claim of overbreadth, we must first determine whether the statute inhibits conduct protected by the first amendment. Hill, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 786.
One may challenge a statute as overbroad only if the statute may inhibit the exercise of rights of expression or association protected by the first amendment. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d at 226, citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830, 839-40, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-16 (1973). In this case, defendant has not alleged that the drug-induced-homicide statute implicates any first amendment safeguard. Therefore, defendant's overbreadth argument is not well taken. In arguing that the statute is capable of inconsistent enforcement, defendant apparently confuses the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth because he cites authority that addresses only the vagueness doctrine: " n reviewing whether a statute is vague, a court may also consider the legislative purpose and the evil that the statute is designed to remedy." People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 486 (2000). We consider each of defendant's arguments in the context of the vagueness doctrine.
2. Vagueness
Due process requires that the proscriptions of a criminal statute be clearly defined. "The statute must provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct so that he or she may act accordingly." Maness, 191 Ill. 2d at 483-84. " ' "No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." ' " Maness, 191 Ill. 2d at 483-84, quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 450 (1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 41, 144 L.Ed. 2d 67, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999), quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 83 L.Ed. 888, 890, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619 (1939). " he statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and fact finders that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions." People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 256 (1994). Although due process requires that a statute must not be "so vague" that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning or application, mathematical certainty in language is not required. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 356 (1996). "To prevail on a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not implicate first amendment concerns, a party must demonstrate that the statute was vague as applied to the conduct for which the party prosecuted." Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d at 228.
a. Legislative Intent
Defendant argues that the statute is vague because its language does not reflect the legislature's intent "to stop drug traffickers, the professional drug dealers." When considering whether a statute is vague, we assume, absent a contrary legislative intent, that the statute's words have their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. In addition to those words, we must consider the legislative objective and the evil that the statute is designed to remedy. People v. Fabing, 143 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1991); Hill, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 788.
Defendant correctly points out that the legislature did not expressly set forth the purpose of the statute. However, we reject defendant's assertion that the statute is unconstitutional for failing to specify "dealers" as the intended targets of prosecution. The drug-induced-homicide statute applies to any person who violates section 401 of the Act by knowingly "delivering" a controlled substance. In the context of the statute, "delivery" is defined as the actual,
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