Lachenman v. Stice11/30/2005
he conduct which gave rise to the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 787. In the present case, we find no error in the trial court's decision to exclude evidence regarding the subsequent attacks by the Stices' dogs.
III. Sentimental Value
The trial court ruled that Lachenman would be precluded from presenting evidence regarding future breeding income, pedigree information, photographs of her dog, and any evidence of her dog's value in excess of its purchase price and the veterinary bills Lachenman incurred as a result of the attack on her dog. Upon appeal, Lachenman claims that she should be allowed to proceed on a claim and present evidence regarding the value of her dog which exceeds its purchase price and the veterinary costs she incurred. The Stices counter that a dog is personal property and that the correct measure of damages for the loss of personal property is the fair market value of that property. See Ind. Code § 15-5-10-1 (Burns Code Ed. Repl. 2005) (dogs declared to be personal property subject to taxation the same as other personal property); Ridenour v. Furness, 546 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (damages for total destruction to personal property, including animals, are measured by the fair market value of the property at the time of loss).
Lachenman cites several older Indiana cases claiming they support the contention that a dog has a value much greater than fair market value. In State v. Sumner, 2 Ind. 377 (1850), the defendant was indicted for maliciously killing a dog valued at ten dollars. The trial court quashed the indictment upon the grounds that a dog was not regarded by law as having any value. Upon appeal, the court discussed the common law distinction between tame animals, wild animals, and those animals, whether wild or tame, which "are of so base a nature as not to be the subject of larceny." Id. at 378. The court ultimately concluded, "A dog, then, being a domestic animal, is a subject of absolute property, and, though not intrinsically for his flesh, yet extrinsically for his use, being of some, we might say of much, value, the killing of him under our statute, is an indictable offence." Id. Thus, the question in Sumner was whether a dog had any value such that the killing of a dog was indictable as the malicious destruction of property. The court held that a dog had value as property, but we do not read the case to support compensating the owner of a dog at a value higher than the fair market value of the dog. Similarly, in Kinsman v. State, 77 Ind. 132 (1881), the defendant, charged with killing the dog of another, claimed that a dog was not necessarily an animal of value and could not support a conviction for malicious destruction of property. The court noted that under statutes in force at that time, dogs were taxed as property. Id. at 135. The court then stated, "It may well be said, we think, that any article of property which the law subjects to taxation is prima facie an article of value." Id.
Lachenman claims that in the case of Lowell v. Gathright, 97 Ind. 313 (1884), the court upheld an award of $200 for the killing of a dog. To be sure, the plaintiff recovered $200 as a result of the defendant's killing of the plaintiff's dog, but the value of the dog was not a question in Lowell. Instead, the defendant in Lowell claimed, and the court rejected, that he had a right to shoot the dog because the dog was not tagged pursuant to statute. Id. at 314-15. In the other case relied upon by Lachenman, Jacquay v. Hartzell, 1 Ind.App. 500, 27 N.E. 1105 (1891), the court wrote that " ne who willfully and maliciously kills a dog which is not vicious or dangerous in its disposition and habits, and is not engaged in committing damages, is liable
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Indiana DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|