 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lachenman v. Stice11/30/2005
to the owner for the fair value of the animal." 27 N.E. at 1105 (emphasis supplied). These cases do not provide support for Lachenman's claim that she may recover damages in excess of the fair market value of her dog. Instead, they provide support for the position that fair market value is indeed what she may recover.
Whatever support these cases provide to the notion that dogs, as beloved pets, have a certain "worth" or "value" beyond their market value, we do not take them to be support for the notion that under the law a dog owner may recover more than the fair market value of the dog when killed. However unfeeling it may seem, the bottom line is that a dog is personal property, and the measure of damages for the destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at the time of the destruction. See Ridenour, 546 N.E.2d at 325; Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. S.E. Lab Group, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 615, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that measure of damages for destruction of animals is fair market value thereof at time of destruction), trans. denied.
Furthermore, we disagree with Lachenman that Mitchell v. Mitchell, 685 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), and Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), support a claim for recovery of the "sentimental value" of a dog. Both of these cases did uphold the award of damages which were based upon sentimental value, which included family photographs and videos in Mitchell and trophy rings in Campins. However, both cases limited their holdings:
"Concerned with the danger of exaggerated sentimentality, the [Campins] court stated that it was 'referring to the feelings generated by items of almost purely sentimental value such as heirlooms, family papers and photographs, . . . .'" Mitchell, 685 N.E.2d at 1088 (quoting Campins, 461 N.E.2d at 721 (citations omitted)).
Whether we agree with the holdings of these cases or not, we conclude that they do not apply to the case before us. A family dog may well have sentimental value, but it is not an item of almost purely sentimental value such as an heirloom. In short, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling excluding evidence regarding sentimental value, or value other than fair market value, was in error.
Conclusion
At times in her brief, Lachenman seems to argue that the trial court rejected all of her claims. We emphasize that the trial court's grant of summary judgment left intact Lachenman's claim of negligence against the Stices with regard to the actual value of her dog, i.e. not including emotional distress, "sentimental" value, etc. The trial court limited evidence of the value of Lachenman's dog to the purchase price and veterinary bill. To the extent that the trial court's ruling meant to limit Lachenman's claims to the fair market value of her dog, it was correct. However, we do not agree that the purchase price, which is obviously relevant to the question of fair market value, is the only admissible evidence regarding fair market value. Thus, upon remand, the only issues remaining for trial are those of the Stices' liability and whether and to what extent they caused the loss of Lachenman's dog, recovery for which is limited to the fair market value of the dog.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NAJAM, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Indiana DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|