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Lachenman v. Stice11/30/2005
nds usually tolerated by a decent society and causes mental distress of a very serious kind. Branham, 744 N.E.2d at 523. In the appropriate case, the question can be decided as a matter of law. Id.
Here, considering the facts in the light most favorable to Lachenman as the non-moving party, we can conclude as a matter of law that the Stices' actions do not constitute "outrageous" behavior as contemplated by the narrow definition adopted from the Restatement. In other words, however negligent the Stices' behavior may have been, we cannot say that it was so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and should be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. See Bradley, 720 N.E.2d at 752-53. Moreover, there is also nothing in the record which would support a reasonable inference to the effect that the Stices intended to cause Lachenman emotional distress by their behavior. See Cullison, 570 N.E.2d at 31 (intent to cause emotional harm to plaintiff constitutes basis for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Stices upon Lachenman's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Lachenman also claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Stices with regard to her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Indiana case law dealing with this subject has been evolving in recent years. Traditionally, Indiana courts analyzed claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the "impact" rule. Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Under the traditional impact rule, a plaintiff could not recover for emotional damages unless the emotional distress was accompanied by and resulted from a physical injury caused by an impact to the plaintiff. Id. In Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind.1991), our Supreme Court modified the impact rule, holding that when:
"a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person[,] . . . such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff."
Following Shuamber, cases continued to interpret the modified impact rule as requiring a direct physical impact. See, e.g., Comfax Corp. v. N. Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Roe v. N. Adams Comm. Sch. Corp., 647 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Miller v. May, 656 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), disapproved of by Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000); Dollar Inn, Inc. v. Slone, 695 N.E.2d 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Firstmark Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Goss, 699 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. City of Nappanee, 704 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Ross v. Cheema, 716 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 1999).
On the same day that our Supreme Court decided Ross, supra, it also handed down Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1999). In that case, plaintiff Wood was walking with her co-worker and friend, Brittain. The two came to the intersection of two streets, and began to cross the street after the pedestrian "walk" sign appeared. As they crossed, defendant Conder, who was driving a truck, struck Brittain, hurling her to the pave
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