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Ramage v. State10/25/2005
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/25/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
. On June 6, 2002, William Earl Ramage, Jr. fell asleep at the wheel while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Ramage lost control of the car, which ultimately crossed the road and collided with a power pole, killing his two passengers, Barbara Kay Kennedy and Krisan Dewayne Martin. Ramage was charged with aggravated DUI for Kennedy's death and was charged with culpable negligence manslaughter for Martin's death. Ramage pled guilty in the Rankin County Circuit Court to both offenses. On the aggravated DUI charge, the circuit court sentenced Ramage to a term of twenty-two years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with five years suspended, seventeen years to serve and five years of post-release supervision. On the manslaughter charge, Ramage was sentenced to twenty years, with five years suspended, fifteen years to serve and five years of post-release supervision. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. After his conviction, Ramage filed a motion to vacate and set aside his conviction and sentence, asserting (1) that pleading guilty to both charges subjected him to double jeopardy; (2) that his indictment was fatally defective; (3) that his sentencing order was unconstitutional; (4) that he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) that his pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily. Upon the denial of his motion by the circuit court, Ramage appeals to this Court. Finding no error in the circuit court's denial of Ramage's motion for post-conviction relief, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
. "When reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However, where questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo." Penn v. State, 909 So. 2d 135, 136 ( ) (MisS.Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 ( ) (Miss. 1999)).
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER RAMAGE'S CONVICTION OF BOTH AGGRAVATED DUI AND CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE MANSLAUGHTER IS PROHIBITED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES
. Ramage claims that the two convictions subjected him to double jeopardy because, while he performed only one act of driving while intoxicated, he was charged with separate offenses for the deaths of Kennedy and Martin.
. Double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and against multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown, 731 So. 2d at 599 ( ) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). In order to determine whether a defendant has been subjected to double jeopardy, this Court employs the "same elements" test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See, e.g., Houston v. State, 887 So. 2d 808, 814 ( ) (MisS.Ct. App. 2004). Where a defendant is charged with violating two or more separate statutory provisions, this test "requires an inquiry into whether each offense charged requires proof of an element not contained in the other." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 299. Where the same elements are required by each, they are considered the same offense, and double jeopardy bars additional punishment. Id. However, where different elements are required by each offense, double jeopardy does not prevent prosecution and punishment for both offenses. Id.; see also Ho
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