State v. Long10/18/2005
yconsiderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003). " nder Rule 403, the determination of whether relevant evidence should be excluded is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court can be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion." State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 523, 528 S.E.2d 326, 352-53, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L.Ed. 2d 498 (2000). A ruling under Rule 403 "may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Collins, 345 N.C. 170, 174, 478 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1996).
In the instant case, the trial court's decision to hold a voir dire hearing and receive testimony from medical professionals regarding Kalen's blood alcohol concentration before issuing its ruling demonstrates that the trial court carefully weighed the probative value of the evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. See State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 491, 488 S.E.2d 576, 587 (1997). Furthermore, Dr. Lantz testified that Kalen was alive immediately before the infliction of her injuries and that the severity of Kalen's injuries caused her death regardless of whether she had been consuming alcohol. Although Dr. Winaker could not render an opinion as to whether Kalen was experiencing a seizure immediately prior to her death, Dr. Winaker testified that seizures are usually not a result of alcohol poisoning but are due to alcoholism and thewithdrawal of alcohol from the alcoholic person. Thus, in light of the testimony received by the trial court and its decision to delay its determination, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Kalen's blood alcohol concentration. Therefore, defendant's second argument is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly considered factors outside the record while imposing defendant's sentence. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court made comments regarding religion, drug and alcohol abuse, and drug smuggling, while engaging in colloquies with the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, and defendant. Specifically, the trial court queried whether Kalen had time for a "last prayer" before her death, expressed amazement at how persons consume illegal drugs while refusing to take an aspirin if the seal is broken, and commented about a television program concerning a drug smuggling cartel. While the better practice would have been for the trial court to not have made these statements, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court considered these matters in imposing defendant's sentence. Therefore, defendant's third argument is overruled.
In a motion for appropriate relief filed with his appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him in the aggravated range for second-degree murder. Defendant assertsthat the trial court was prohibited from sentencing him in the aggravated range because the aggravating factor was not submitted to the jury. We agree.
In State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005), our Supreme Court recently examined the constitutionality of North Carolina's structured sentencing scheme in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L.Ed. 2d 403 (2004). In Allen, the Court concluded that, when " pplied to North Carolina's structured sentencing scheme, the rule of Apprendi and Blakely is: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increa
Page 1 2 3 4 North Carolina DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|