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In re J.B.10/4/2005
), (6) (2001). We further note that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1102 allows parties to file motions to terminate parental rights in pending child abuse or neglect proceedings and gives the trial court authority to consolidate the actions pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 42. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1102(a), (c) (2001). A review of N.C.G.S. § 1102, as well as the rest of Chapter 7B, Article 11, reveals no requirement as suggested by [the respondent]. Here, such a hearing on abuse and neglect maywell have been merely redundant with parts of the termination hearing.
Id. at 571, 571 S.E.2d at 69.
In the case before us, the trial court conducted the termination of parental rights hearing on 22 January 2004 and 5 February 2004. At the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing on 5 February 2004, the trial court conducted the article 9 hearings. As we held in In re Faircloth, the article 9 hearings were not prerequisites for the termination of parental rights hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not err by conducting the termination of parental rights hearing prior to the article 9 hearings.
II.
Respondent next contends that the trial court violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to comply with "the statutory review timelines" in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 before terminating her parental rights.
This argument fails for the reasons stated above. Article 11 and article 9 proceedings under the Juvenile Code are separate proceedings. Respondent has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of article 11 of the Juvenile Code. Rather, respondent seeks to add a requirement, not contemplated by the General Assembly, to the procedure established under article 11. Therefore, we overrule this assignment of error.
III.
Respondent next contends " he trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction when it terminated [repondent's] parental rights before conducting a timely permanency planning hearing." In support of this contention, respondent argues that "because had no authority to file the TPR Petition in the first place without a directive from the trial court, the TPR Petition is not a valid pleading, and therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the TPR Order."
Respondent has cited no statutory requirement that DSS must receive a "directive" from the trial court before filing a termination of parental rights petition. To the contrary, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3), as discussed above, clearly provides that a county department of social services "to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction" may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of either parent. DSS had custody of the children on 8 October 2003 when it filed the petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent and the children's father and it was a proper petitioner under the statute. Respondent's argument is without merit.
IV.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by failing to specify the grounds upon which it terminated respondent's parental rights within its conclusions of law or in the decretal section of the order to terminate parental rights. Termination of parental rights is a two-step process. In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. at 575, 571 S.E.2d at 72. "At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincingevidence that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists." Id. If a ground for termination is established, the trial court proceeds to the dispositional hearing to consider the be
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