 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Wichser11/1/2005
doing this is because he's employed and he's making progress. If I give him front-end time, he's probably going to lose his job and then it's stupid. I might as well just give him the one to two.
It is clear from this litany that the trial court was well aware of § 29-2260 and that the court felt there was sufficient evidence to support the imposition of probation under that statute. Some of those factors have been previously outlined in this opinion. What also is clear is that this offense is a serious one and would weigh in favor of jail time, but as stated in State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 588 N.W.2d 556 (1999), that in itself does not indicate an abuse of discretion. " sentence should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Id. at 1005, 588 N.W.2d at 565. State v. Harrison pointed out the importance of the alternative of probation in the following statement:
Indeed, this court has repeatedly recognized the importance of probation to our system of criminal justice, stating that "'" sentence not involving confinement is to be preferred to a sentence involving partial or total confinement in the absence of affirmative reasons to the contrary.". . .'" State v. Javins, 199 Neb. 38, 40-41, 255 N.W.2d 872, 874 (1977), quoting State v. Shonkwiler, 187 Neb. 747, 194 N.W.2d 172 (1972). Thus, "justice" may certainly be served by a sentence of probation. Whether justice is so served is a matter that is, in the first instance, properly left to the trial court.
255 Neb. at 1005, 588 N.W.2d at 565. Our standard of review is not de novo. If it were, we might reach a different result, but, in this instance, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that, therefore, the trial court's sentence was not excessively lenient. We affirm.
The mandates of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,198 (Reissue 2004), under which statute Wichser was convicted, require us to address Wichser's sentence in regard to his driving privilege. Section 60-6,198 provides, in relevant part, that the court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, order the person not to drive any motor vehicle for any purpose for a period of at least sixty days and not more than fifteen years from the date ordered by the court and shall order that the operator's license of such person be revoked for the same period.
In examining the court's probation order, we find, and the parties agree, that no order of suspension was made by the trial court as required by the above statute. We therefore must reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings for the trial court to order a license suspension in accordance with the statute.
CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm the trial court's sentence of probation, but reverse, and remand for the trial court to order a suspension of Wichser's license in accordance with the mandates of § 60-6,198, under which he was convicted.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
|