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State v. Endsley10/19/2005
rm him of the specific offense. Specifically, the indictment put appellant on notice that he was charged with causing Kastanek's death, as a result of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and while driving with a suspended license. This statement fairly informed appellant of the charges against him.
{ } Appellant also argues that the indictment should have advised him of what license suspension it was referring to. Such specificity was not required. In other cases, courts have found similar specifics were not necessary in the indictment. For instance, in an indictment for manslaughter, the specific felony or misdemeanor relied upon need not be pleaded in the indictment. State v. Whitley (Jan. 8, 1987), 4th Dist. No. 1225. And in State v. Smith, 2d Dist. No. 2001-CA-98, 2002-Ohio-4118, the defendant argued that the indictment was not specific because it did not identify the mechanism that caused the victim's death. In response the court noted, "we are not dealing with different offenses having penalties of differing severity. Regardless of the particular mechanism by which the decedent's death is caused, the crime is Murder, punishable as provided for in R.C. 2929.02." Id. at .
{ } Furthermore, while appellant argues that he was not aware of what driving suspension the indictment referred to, he filed a transcript from the very case that the suspension arose from. Hence, he must have been aware of the suspension to which the indictment referred.
{ } Thus, the indictment against appellant was not defective. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is without merit.
{ } Appellant's third assignment of error states:
{ } "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JANUARY 28, 2004 DECISION THAT THE MEDICAL BLOOD TESTING RESULTS WERE ADMISSIBLE WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION OF O.R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) AS THERE WAS MORE THAN JUST A FAILURE OF THE STATE TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TWO (2) HOUR RULE FOR THE DRAWING OF THE SUBJECT BLOOD."
{ } In ruling on appellant's motion to suppress the blood test results, the trial court found that appellee failed to establish substantial compliance with the two-hour rule for the drawing of blood and that the deviation was not de minimus. However, the court ruled that the medical blood testing results were admissible with expert testimony for the purpose of establishing a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).
{ } Our standard of review with respect to a motion to suppress is first limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Winand (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 288, 688 N.E.2d 9, citing Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 608, 645 N.E.2d 802. Such a standard of review is appropriate as, " n a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653, 645 N.E.2d 831. An appellate court accepts the trial court's factual findings and relies upon the trial court's ability to assess the witness's credibility, but independently determines, without deference to the trial court, whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard. State v. Rice (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 91, 94, 717 N.E.2d 351. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed when it is supported by substantial credible evidence. Id.
{ } In Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 100, at paragraph one of the syllabus, 532 N.E.2d 130, the Ohio Supreme Court held that in
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