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Commonwealth v. Sands11/2/2005
erest in reducing drunk driving deaths and injuries, and that they only involve a modest intrusion on the privacy and liberty of motorists. Accordingly, the Court has found that suspicionless stops at such roadblocks are constitutionally reasonable. The question remains, however, whether the greater individual privacy protections afforded by Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution compel a different result.
ased on the record in front of us, we find that the trial court properly concluded that Appellant failed to show that DUI roadblocks are so ineffective that they must be declared constitutionally unreasonable.
Id. at 583-589 (citations omitted). Thus, Beaman echoes the concern of Representative Harper that the Commonwealth has a compelling and vital interest in reducing drunken driving. Furthermore, the court's statement that the Commonwealth's needs in reducing drunk driving exceed the normal demands of law enforcement, and therefore, "regimes of suspicionless searches or seizures" are valid under certain circumstances, indicates that a balancing test must take into account the efficacy or efficiency of certain law enforcement methods in apprehending drunk drivers. Id.
25 The other side of this balancing test is the cumulative privacy interest of the citizens of our Commonwealth to be secure in their persons, effects and privacy and free from unreasonable searches. Indeed, this is an interest that this Court vigilantly seeks to safeguard and we shall not "give the police absolute, unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an individual's life for no cause whatsoever." Swanger, 307 A.2d at 878.
However, "the law of search and seizure is constantly evolving, its focus remains on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime." Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 573 (Pa. Super. 2004).
26 We hold that the limited intrusion permitted by Section 6308(b) in the case of a vehicular stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the driver is driving under the influence , as balanced against the Commonwealth's salutary interest in preventing DUI violations, violates neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Section 8. In such cases, the officer must be able to relay specific and articulable facts that would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person is driving under the influence, and we conclude that this requirement is sufficient to ensure that the police do not infringe upon the citizens' rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
27 Turning to the facts of this case, Officer Keegan was on patrol during the early morning hours when he observed Appellant at 12:15 a.m. Officer Keegan witnessed Appellant drift across a clearly visible fog line three times. Each time, Appellant would cross over the fog line by approximately three feet and then slowly drift back. This occurred on a portion of road without any sharp curves or obstructions to explain the weaving.
28 Furthermore, in determining whether Officer Keegan possessed reasonable suspicion, we must accord due weight "to the specific reasonable inferences is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). Officer Keegan had made between forty and fifty driving under the influence arrests at the time that he stopped Appellant. In light of his experience and his specific articulable observations, we conclude that Officer Ke
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