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Bartlett v. Bradford Publishing10/17/2005
phia Newpapers, Inc.,567 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citing Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.657, 665-666, 688 (1989)). The fact that The Bradford Era could have employed a higher degree of journalistic responsibility does not constitute actual malice. See Lewis, 833 A.2d at 193. "Mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact." Curran, 546 A.2d at 645 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283, n. 24 (1964)). Although a failure to corroborate a source's statements may be indicative of sub-standard journalistic techniques, it does not satisfy the actual malice standard. See e.g., St. Amant,390 U.S. at 730 (holding that trial court properly found lack of evidence for actual malice despite fact that defendant relied solely upon affidavit of single person of unknown credibility); Curran,546 A.2d at 651 (finding lack of evidence for actual malice where reporter mischaracterized statements made during a press conference because of his own admittedly faulty assumptions, despite the fact that fellow reporter had accurately relayed the content of the press conference).
17 Bartlett also argues that the inconsistent testimony between Holliday and one of her sources regarding the number of times they had spoken prior to Holliday using him as a source is indicative of actual malice. Bartlett asserts that this Court must believe that Holliday " ied about her previous contact with said source," and this is indicative of actual malice. Brief for Appellant at 18. We begin by noting that this Court is not required to believe that this inconsistency, assuming that the source's testimony is true, is evidence that Holliday purposefully or willfully lied under oath. However, even if, as Bartlett alleges, Holliday lied about how well she knew one of her sources at her deposition, it is not material to the issue of actual malice and summary judgment in favor of The Bradford Era was proper.
18 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2(1), a court may grant summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact. A material fact "is one that directly affects the outcome of the case." Fortney v. Callenberger, 801 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. 2002). Disputed facts which are not critical to the issue in the petition will not preclude summary judgment. See Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 602 A.2d 324, 335 (Pa. Super. 1991) (plurality) (citing Pierce v. Com. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 406 A.2d 1186, 1187 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979)). Whether Holliday was lying about the number of times she had contact with a news source, when her deposition was taken nearly a year after she allegedly acted with actual malice, is not material to whether she acted with actual malice when she wrote the article a year earlier.
19 Considering the standard of review we must employ, along with the high burden of proof placed upon Bartlett, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment in favor of The Bradford Era.
20 Order AFFIRMED.
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