 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Reese v. State10/23/2001
Brandon Reese appeals his convictions for driving under the influence and possession of an open container. He claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting evidence of his previous DUI conviction. Reese also contends that the trial court erred by: (i) quashing Reese's subpoena of certain police radio communications records, (ii) ruling on the merits of a motion to recuse, (iii) refusing to allow certain testimony concerning the bias of a State witness, and (iv) failing to require the State to produce the original of the videotape of Reese's arrest. Reese further argues that the City Court of Atlanta is not legally constituted. We find that none of these claims has merit and, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Grant v. State, 195 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) (393 SE2d 737) (1990). So viewed, the evidence shows that, in the early morning hours of August 5, 2000, a red jeep crossed several lanes to exit from northbound I-75 onto Northside Drive in Atlanta and "cut off" an unmarked police car driven by Major Peter Andreson, an off- duty police officer. Andreson followed the jeep northbound on Northside Drive, but the jeep made a U-turn in the front yard of a residence and headed back in a southerly direction. Andreson radioed Officer Centola for assistance. Upon receiving Andreson's message, Centola drove to Northside Drive where he saw a jeep weaving across the lanes. The vehicle would also slow or stop as it came to the reversible lane markers, as if the driver thought they were traffic signals. At Northside and Fourteenth Street, the jeep turned into a convenience store parking lot, and Centola parked across the street at a Krystal restaurant. Centola intended to stop the vehicle to investigate a traffic violation, but decided that the gas station was too crowded to perform a field sobriety test. Reese and his passenger left the gas station and drove across the street to the Krystal restaurant where Reese and a passenger got out of the jeep. Officer Centola approached them before they could go inside.
Centola noticed that Reese smelled of alcohol, that his face was pale and sweaty, and that he was thick-tongued and slow in his speech. In response to questioning by the officer, Reese denied he had been drinking, but agreed to undergo a field sobriety test. The field sobriety test included the horizontal gaze nystagmus evaluation, the nine step walk-and-turn, the one leg stand, and a recitation of the alphabet. Reese performed poorly on these tests. Reese also took a preliminary breath test which indicated the presence of alcohol. Centola concluded that Reese was not safe to drive, and that he was under the influence of alcohol. Centola arrested Reese and informed him of his implied consent rights. Reese then underwent a breath analysis test which showed he had a blood alcohol content of .182. In Reese's jeep, Officer Centola found four empty bottles of beer.
1. Reese argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Centola stopped Reese without articulable grounds to believe he had committed a traffic offense. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing with respect to the motion to suppress.
"Credibility of witnesses, resolution of any conflict or inconsistency, and weight to be accorded testimony is solely the province of the judge on a motion to suppress." Rogers v. State, 155 Ga. App. 685, 686 (2) (272 SE2d 549) (1980). The trial court's findings of facts must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 151
Page 1 2 3 4 Georgia DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|