 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Garrett12/1/2005
81, 790-92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (concluding that first degree premeditated murder, a knowing second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide are "result-of-conduct offenses"; Appendix of a proper jury charge included). He, nevertheless, insists that the Page instructions apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1995; therefore, he maintains, the instructions are erroneous. We disagree.
The statutory definitions of relevant culpable mental states appear in Code section 39-11-302. These definitions have not changed since their enactment as part of the comprehensive 1989 revision of Tennessee's Criminal Code. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a) - (d) (1991 & 2003). The trial court in this case obviously patterned its instructions relative to culpable mental states after the example set forth in Page, for which we find no error. Admittedly the suggested jury instructions set forth in Page are stated to apply to "First Degree Murder (Premeditated Killing) (For Offenses Committed on or after July 1, 1995)." 81 S.W.3d at 790. The defendant, however, was not charged with premeditated first degree murder; his indicted offense was first degree felony murder, and even though both premeditated first degree murder and felony murder were revised effective July 1, 1995, Page focused on the proper mens rea and its applicable conduct elements for criminal offenses. The statutory definitions of relevant culpable mental states did not change in 1995.
The defendant also maintains, without any supporting authority, that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that the requirement of "knowingly" is established if shown that the defendant acted "intentionally" and that the requirement of "recklessly" is established if shown that the defendant acted "intentionally" or "knowingly." Those instructions, however, were approved in Page and find direct support in Code section 39-11-301(a)(2), which provides in relevant part:
(2) When the law provides that . . . recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish to an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (1991 & 2003). The defendant's argument must fail.
In a related argument, the defendant furthermore insists that via the instruction given for "intentionally," the trial court "constructively amended" the indictment to charge him with premeditated murder when, in fact, he was charged with a reckless homicide perpetrated during the commission of arson. This argument is unavailing. Evidently the defendant is under the erroneous impression that only a reckless homicide will suffice to prove felony murder. However, a conviction may be obtained even though the proof shows that the killing was intended. See State v. Frank Whitmore, No. 03C01-9404-CR-00141, slip op. at 13 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 19, 1997).
Yet another complaint that the defendant registers is that the trial court provided the jury with an erroneous and misleading instruction and definition of the mens rea elements of first degree "reckless" felony murder and the underlying felony of arson. In terms of the mens rea element of recklessly, the defendant again claims that the instructional language taken from the Page decision is inadequate, and we again reject that contention.
Although the defendant's argument regarding the mens rea element of arson is not entirely clear, we glean that it focuses on the conduct element tied to the mental state required to prove arson. As r
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|