State v. Garrett12/1/2005
owing funds to facilitate Mr. Miller's testimony in the hearing See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(c) (stating that the trial court "may in its discretion allow testimony in open court on issues raised in the motion for new trial") (emphasis added).
VII. Brady Violation
The defendant argues that the state withheld an exculpatory statement in which Captain Jenkins informed Mr. Cooper that the utility room door in the defendant's home was latched, not locked, and that the withholding of this information is reversible error pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). The state counters that the statement is neither exculpatory nor material and therefore not a Brady violation.
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution has a constitutional duty to furnish an accused with exculpatory evidence pertaining to either the accused's guilt or innocence and the punishment that may be imposed. Failure to reveal exculpatory evidence violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999), the Court enumerated three components of a Brady violation: "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Id. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. at 1948.
In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that constitutional error results in the withholding of "material" evidence, and materiality exists when "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383.
The "materiality" of suppressed, favorable evidence was discussed at length in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995), and Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. 2001). Four aspects are highlighted in those cases. First, materiality does not demand a showing by a preponderance that the suppressed evidence would have resulted in the defendant's acquittal. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58. Second, materiality is not an evidence-sufficiency test. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58. Third, once constitutional error has been found, there is no need for further harmless error review. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 63. Last, the "suppressed evidence [is to be] considered collectively, not item by item" to gauge materiality. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. at 1567. Plainly stated, establishing materiality requires a "showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; see Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58.
The defendant contends that the state should have informed him that Mr. Cooper would testify that after investigating the crime scene, Captain Jenkins informed him that the utility room door was latched, not locked. While testifying, Mr. Cooper explained that Captain Jenkins concluded that if the utility room door had been locked during the fire, the firefighters searching for the victim would have used a fire axe to break the door down, which they did not do. Captain Jenkins reported that when he inspected the door, it was latched, requiring him to use both hands to unlatch it. As noted earlier in this opinion, this court reversed t
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