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Larsen v. State12/6/2001
prove that the defendant intended to drive under the influence, only that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition and that she intended to drive. Id.
Further, "OCGA § 40-6-391 (b) specifically provides: `The fact that any person charged with violating this Code section is or has been legally entitled to use a drug shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this Code section.'" Kimberly v. State, 180 Ga. App. 521 (1) (349 SE2d 489) (1986). Finally, " nly involuntary intoxication sufficient to remove the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the act may excuse a criminal act. Voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any criminal act. OCGA § 16-3-4." Bailey v. State, 198 Ga. App. 632, 633 (2) (402 SE2d 363) (1991).
We recently reiterated that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for a criminal act in a case in which the defendant alleged she had no intent to bite a police officer while she was high on crack cocaine. Henderson v. State, Case Number A01A1265, decided November 5, 2001.
In this case, the defendant testified that she had no intent to drive, and that she remembered nothing from the time that she took her bedtime medication and the time she "came to" handcuffed in the back of a police car. However, the trier of fact, after watching a videotape of the defendant's arrest, did not find her testimony about being in a sleep state credible. He further pointed out that the defendant was on notice from her own daughter that she had a problem with alcohol, but that she chose to drink an excessive amount of alcohol the evening of her arrest. Credibility findings are exclusively for the trier of fact. Gilmore v. State, 242 Ga. App. 470, 471 (1) (530 SE2d 221) (2000); Barber v. State, 235 Ga. App. 170 (509 SE2d 93) (1998).
We conclude that the evidence as outlined above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Larsen guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Larsen also contends that the trial judge "was biased and failed to hear appellant's case impartially," based on selected remarks the judge made while explaining the reasoning behind his verdict. "The alleged bias of the judge [which would warrant a recusal] must be of such a nature and intensity to prevent the defendant from obtaining a trial uninfluenced by the court's prejudgment." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Birt v. State, 256 Ga. 483, 486 (4) (350 SE2d 241) (1986). In this case, the trial judge did what fact finders do in every case and applied his own life experiences and knowledge to the evidence at hand. Further, some of the statements that Larsen quotes in support of her argument that the judge was biased addressed the reasoning behind his credibility findings, which again is the fact-finder's province. Finally, the sentencing transcript reveals that the judge did not "ignore" the defense expert's testimony or the testimony of Larsen and her daughter; rather, he disbelieved them.
"`Mere dissatisfaction with the court's rulings' is not a legally sufficient ground for recusal," Butler v. Biven Software, 238 Ga. App. 525, 526 (1) (522 SE2d 1) (1999), or for a post-conviction claim of bias and partiality.
Judgment affirmed.
Smith, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur.
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