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State v. Worwood12/15/2005
uld have interpreted these actions as an arrest. Accordingly, I would hold that Wright effected a level three arrest as soon as Worwood became aware that he was in police custody, that his vehicle had been seized, and that he was going to be transported a significant distance for the purpose of being handed off to another officer. See State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Orme, J., dissenting) ("The accepted rule is that what might have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would believe himself to be under arrest."); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (characterizing the relevant inquiry as whether the suspect believed he was being detained). I would also hold that Wright's observations of Worwood provided only a reasonable suspicion that Worwood was driving while intoxicated, but not the level of probable cause required to make an arrest.
Wright's reasonable suspicion clearly justified some detention of Worwood for further investigation. However, Wright exceeded the permissible scope and duration of that detention when he transported Worwood to his home for performance of field sobriety tests that could just as easily have been conducted at the initial scene. "Officers must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly[.]" State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, , 107 P.3d 706 (quotations and citation omitted). Wright testified that he could have performed field sobriety tests at the scene of the initial encounter, but chose not to for the sole reason of personal convenience. The resulting increase in both the scope and the duration of Worwood's detention were therefore unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an otherwise legitimate level two stop. See id. at ("Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further intrusion on [the detainee's] rights." (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).
The majority suggests that Worwood's transport was also justified by Wright's motive to obtain more accurate results from field sobriety tests. I find this unavailing, as field sobriety tests are routinely performed roadside in less than ideal conditions. Further, such a justification would permit the routine "relocation" of drunken driving suspects to a jail or police station where environmental factors such as light, sound, and footing could be controlled.
For these reasons, I would hold that Wright's actions constitute both a level three stop unsupported by probable cause, and an impermissible departure from the allowable scope and duration of a legitimate level two stop. Under either analysis, the challenged evidence must be suppressed and Worwood's conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion.
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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