Rideout v. State10/28/2005
rictions imposed upon McArthur's liberty were reasonable, and hence lawful, under the circumstances. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331-33. For our purposes, the decision in McArthur is relevant because the Court addressed an argument by McArthur that the misdemeanor crimes for which he was convicted were minor in nature and did not justify the restraint imposed -- keeping him out of his home -- which he contended was "nearly as serious" as the warrantless entry in Welsh. Id. at 335-36. The Court responded:
We nonetheless find significant distinctions. The evidence at issue here was of crimes that were "jailable," not "nonjailable." See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998); ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(3) (possession of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 600/3.5; ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(1) (possession of drug paraphernalia punishable by up to one year in jail). In Welsh, we noted that, "given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense." 466 U.S. at 754, n. 14. The same reasoning applies here, where class C misdemeanors include such widely diverse offenses as drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a railroad platform, bribery by a candidate for public office, and assault. See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4-8-2 (1998); ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11-504; ch. 720, § 5/12-1.
McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336. The Court concluded that ". the need to preserve evidence of a 'jailable' offense was sufficiently urgent or pressing to justify the restriction upon entry that the police imposed." Id.
[ ] The unmistakable implication of the discussion in McArthur is that the distinction drawn by the Court in Welsh between minor offenses that do not justify a warrantless entry into a residence and those offenses that do is predicated upon whether the subject offense carries a potential jail term. Several other courts have concluded that the distinction should be whether an offense is "jailable" or "non-jailable." See State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d 306, 312-14 (Idaho 2004); City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002); State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2001); State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1996); Stark v. N.Y. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 104 A.D.2d 194, 483 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Ulysse v. State, 899 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2005); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cherry, 605 S.E.2d at 306-07; and In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal.App.3d 154, 159, 270 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
[ ] In this case, the deputies had probable cause to believe that the occupants of the residence were in possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a misdemeanor. In Wyoming, a first offense for possession of less than three ounces of marijuana is punishable by up to 12 months imprisonment and/or a fine of $1,000.00. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2005). Under Wyoming law, possession of marijuana is not a minor crime, and the need to preserve evidence of the offense was sufficient to justify the warrantless entry to arrest the occupants of the residence and to secure it until a search warrant or consent could be obtained. Accordingly, we must reject the Defendants' contention that Welsh prohibited the use of exigent circumstances to excuse the warrant requirement here.
CONCLUSION
[ ] The district court did not err in denying the Defendants' motion to suppress. The judgm
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Wyoming DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|