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Grohs v. State8/12/2005
5.155(c)(21) speaks of a defendant's criminal history, this term includes acts that could have been charged as crimes, regardless of whether the defendant was ever prosecuted and convicted for those acts." Thus, in Grohs's case, the State theoretically might have attempted to prove this aggravator by offering evidence that Grohs had committed prior uncharged acts of driving under the influence.
But the State did not rely on uncharged criminal conduct in Grohs's case. Instead, the State relied on Grohs's six prior convictions for DUI. And a defendant's prior convictions are exempted from the right to jury trial recognized in Blakely. That is, when a defendant's maximum sentence hinges on the defendant's prior convictions, at least when the defendant does not dispute the fact of those prior convictions, a sentencing judge can rely on the prior convictions without submitting them to a jury.
We recently explained that this exception for prior convictions makes sense because the fact of a criminal conviction necessarily means that the defendant was offered the right to trial by jury and the right to make the government prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt:
For defendant to be convicted of crime ... , one of three things had to happen: either (1) the defendant exercised their right to trial by jury, and the jury found the defendant guilty; or (2) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived it, choosing instead to be tried by a judge, and the judge found the defendant guilty; or (3) the defendant was offered a jury trial but waived trial altogether, choosing instead to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. Regardless of how the defendant was found guilty, the defendant's right to jury trial and the defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt were both honored - and thus Blakely is satisfied.
Edmonds v. State, __ P.3d __, Alaska App. Opinion No. 1998 (July 29, 2005), slip opinion at p. 6.
Accord: United States v. Orduño-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johns, 336 F.Supp.2d 411, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2004); State v. Chiappetta, 107 P.3d 366, 374 (Ariz. App. 2005); López v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 730-31 (Colo. 2005); State v. Lowery, 826 N.E.2d 340, 352 (Ohio App. 2005); State v. Pérez, 102 P.3d 705, 708-710 (Or. App. 2004); State v. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 201 (Wash. 2005).
We accordingly hold that, consistent with Blakely, a sentencing judge under Alaska's pre-2005 presumptive sentencing laws could properly rely on a defendant's prior convictions as a basis for finding aggravator (c)(21) - at least when the defendant did not dispute the fact of those convictions, and when the State relied simply on the convictions themselves and the legal elements of those crimes, rather than attempting to introduce evidence of the particular facts underlying the prior convictions.
For these reasons, there was no Blakely error at Grohs's sentencing.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
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